Sergio Abranches

The last official preparatory meeting to the Climate Change Convention in Durban is taking place in Panama, since last Saturday. Negotiators will attempt to arrive at feasible drafts to be tabled at the next session of the Climate Convention, COP17, in Durban, South Africa. The signs are that an agreement on the core issues deadlocking conversations is unlikely to happen.

A radical polarization between developed and developing countries emerged since the first preparatory meetings, early this year. This was somehow surprising. COP16, in Cancun, seemed to have restored confidence among parties, and to point towards a more cooperative dialogue. No party or observer would really imagine that a major deal was possible this year, or even next year, especially after the worsening of global economic conditions with a new turn of the financial crisis. But there was some hope that a few meaningful strides would be possible, until conditions were ripe for a final deal.

It seems unlikely that global climate negotiators will be able to solve conflicting views on the core issues that are deadlocking climate talks in this climate of sharp polarization. The present situation seems to indicate that countries have moved backwards to the old veto politics that impeded any significant global climate deal for one decade.

This persistent deadlock threatens the credibility of the Climate Convention (UNFCCC) as the multilateral instrument to negotiate a future, substantive and encompassing global climate deal. A deal that is binding to all major emitters, setting emissions reduction targets that meet the scientific consensus about the minimum levels necessary to achieve relative climate security.

The divide between developed and developing countries seems to have increased over the last months. On the one side developing countries say there will be no broader deal prior to the approval of a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol. The first period ends in 2012. Developing countries argue that they are already committed to reduction goals proportionate to their historical obligations, and commitments from developed countries are still lacking.

It is true that the aggregate commitment from developed countries is still behind scientific requirements. The goals set for the United States in Copenhagen are too low for the major developed emitter. There is little  room in most developing countries to implement emissions reduction policies without substantial financial and technological support from developed countries. But this is definitely not true for the larger emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil, Mexico, and several others. These countries are doing less than they could and should, particularly when we take into account their future emissions, and the pace their emissions is increasing as their economies grow.

Insisting on the continuation of the Kyoto Protocol seems increasingly less credible as a strategy to achieve a meaningful global climate deal. The countries that owe more on the side of further commitments to reduce their emissions are all outside it, namely the United States, China, Brazil, India, and a few other G20 members.

It is more plausible to say that their concern is not really with the future of global climate change policy, but with the immediate impact of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol ending, without a decision about a second one. The focus of concern is what would happen to the financial and technological cooperation mechanisms under the Protocol and to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) that allows for investments in emissions reducing ventures in developing countries to be used as offsets by developed countries.

The negotiators for the European Union said, on a press briefing in Panama, that CDM projects would continue to be accepted as offsets within EU’s own cap and trade framework, even if Kyoto Protocol’s commitments are not renewed.

While developing countries insist on placing the Kyoto Protocol on center stage of negotiations, developed countries are playing it down. U.S. chief negotiator, Todd Stern has been clear in all his statements that his country is out of it, and has no intention to approve it in the future. The U.S. stance has not changed in Panama. The representative from Japan reiterated his country will not be a party to a second commitment period. New Zealand said that they remain prepared to take on a second commitment period only in the context of a comprehensive global agreement that contains legally-binding emission reduction targets for all major emitters. Australia’s position is more or less the same, if not a bit more direct in the sense of only accepting a successor to Kyoto that reaches all major emitters at once.

A second commitment period seems far away, unless there is enough progress on the “long-term” negotiations (AWG-LCA) aiming at a concomitant and comparable deal that encompasses all large emitters, developed and emerging, especially those outside the reach of the Kyoto Protocol.  This global deal, however, is nowhere in sight.

The Kyoto Protocol has very few virtues as far as necessary climate change mitigation is concerned. It is the only legal framework we have. It helped to create a carbon market. But, alas, in spite of being legal, it reaches about a third of  the global emissions encompassed by the pledges registered under the Copenhagen Agreement. It is legal, but it is hardly binding, because there is no enforcement mechanism in place. Its compliance instruments are either lacking or too weak to make a difference. If what counts is the moral and political constraints of being a signatory, than it does not differ too much from the Copenhagen Agreement, especially after its main elements were approved into the Climate Change Convention framework in Cancun. The carbon market has so far failed to prove itself as a working mechanism to effectively reduce emissions, and is far from becoming a global institution.

UNFCCC’s executive secretary, Christiana Figueres, reported progress on the design of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Technology Executive Committee (TEC), but she raised concerns about the need for progress on monitoring, review and verification (MRV). She has also said that negotiators are for some time working against the clock under the Kyoto Protocol. On the motivational side, she said that Durban needs to address further commitments for developed countries under the Protocol and the evolution of the mitigation framework under the Convention for developed and developing countries. That is precisely the key for the deadlock.

Informally what is already under negotiation is a transition regime once the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol ends. The major concern is what will happen to the financial and technological cooperation mechanisms created by the Protocol and with CDM. It doesn’t seem too difficult to foresee that a legal extension of these mechanisms beyond the Protocol’s first commitment period is far more probable to happen than the approval of a meaningful second period. This transition rule and progress on the institutional design of technology cooperation and of the Green Fund seem to be the feasible goals for Durban.

The institutional rules that govern the UN’s decision-making process feeds cross-cutting vetoes and has a clear bias towards the status quo. Usually the only viable exit from a deadlocked status quo is muddling through, or accepting piecemeal, minimal changes at a time. The unanimity rule precludes substantial consensus-based decisions leading to a change of regime. This is particularly true for the global climate change regime. If unanimity is to be enforced in absolute terms, no substantive consensus would be possible in this heterogeneous assembly of 193 countries, that ranges from oil producers to small islands threatened to disappear; from giant emitters, developed and developing, to poor countries that have very low emissions. Some of the smaller emitters show nevertheless a far more consequential disposition to find a new path towards low-carbon development, than most of the fast growing large emitters.

In Copenhagen, the application of the absolute interpretation of the unanimity rule led to the collapse of a deal based on a large consensus among all relevant players. It was defeated by the veto of a handful of ideology-orientated countries, largely peripheral to global politics, and to global climate policy. In Cancun, a more relativistic interpretation of the unanimity rule allowed the waiver of a small minority’s whimsical veto, and the approval of the Cancun Agreements.

If negotiators fail to find a way to solve the gridlock within the next few years, the UNFCCC risks loosing its credibility and legitimacy. It will come to be seen as an irrelevant segment of climate politics, one dominated by diplomatic fencing. The sustainability of the Climate Convention will be in jeopardy. But, much worse, if the logjam extends beyond 2012 the danger increases of the world loosing the possibility of maintaing unavoidable climate change within relatively safe boundaries.

Sergio Abranches

Moving from a high-carbon to a low-carbon economy entails replacing the global energy and industrial high-carbon infrastructure over the next decades. UN’s recent Economic and Social Survey 2011 – The Great Green Technological Transformation estimates replacement costs at $15-$20 trillion, or between one quarter and one third of global income.This is a herculean task. One that has been interpreted more as an insuperable obstacle than as a great opportunity. The cost and magnitude of the shift seems, at first glance, to be a formidable barrier. It takes diverting a large chunk of global savings and investment towards this task. If we do it as fast as science has been asking us to to, we’ll leave unexploited a wealth of high-carbon, relatively low cost resources. But look again. Using these resources represents an unaffordable climatic and environmental cost. The huge mobilization of monetary values to invest in new activities, new materials, new energy sources, new technologies could feed a long boom cycle of economic activity over several decades. Income and profit gains will more than compensate for the cost of replacement. We could start a long cycle of global growth that would add up to one of history’s longer-lasting periods of increasing prosperity.

Because climate change is a global phenomenon, the shift towards a low-carbon economy has to be a global one. It creates distributive risks and advantages. Leaders of several developing and underdeveloped nations argue that it represents a burden they cannot afford. They also say that since they’re not responsible for the GHG emissions that caused the problem, they have no obligation to act. This reasoning corresponds to the “insurmountable obstacle syndrome”. Seeing change as a hindrance impossible to overcome is self-defeating, especially when there is no viable alternative. Besides there is no opting out for anyone.

Obstacles should be viewed as motivations, not deterrents. Rich countries have the opportunity to create an investment dynamic that will by itself be a source of strong job and income creation. Developing and underdeveloped countries have what I call, after Alexander Gerschenkron, the advantages of backwardness. As the UN survey puts it, “developing countries may be able to leapfrog directly to renewable energy sources”. Instead of trying to catch up developed countries through the high-carbon path, they can shortcut to the low-carbon advanced economy.

Read full article here.

Sergio Abranches

The last official preparatory meeting before COP17, in Durban, South Africa, has started yesterday in Bonn pointing to more problems than solutions. Christiana Figueres, top UN climate official, warned the parties about the risk of inaction, but realistically acknowledged that there will likely be very few substantial decisions in Durban. She finally admitted that there is not enough time left to approve the text for a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. A regulatory gap is already unavoidable.

Warning statements by the top climate official always precede the final preparatory meetings. Yvo de Boer used to do that before Figueres. It is also on the script to voice some realistic assessments about what is possible to accomplish. Realism helps to manage expectations.

“We are putting ourselves in a scenario where we will have to develop more powerful technologies to capture emissions out of the atmosphere,” said Figueres. “We are getting into very risky territory,” she concluded to stress that time was running out.

She has also sided with the less developed countries and the small island-states observing that the target agreed upon in Copenhagen to limit global warming to around 2C is unsustainable. She supported the small countries’s plea that the world targets 1.5C instead. In Cancun, there was an agreement that at some point the 1.5C target will be considered.

“In my book, there is no way we can stick to the goal [2C] that we know is completely unacceptable to the most exposed [countries],” Figueres said, according to the Guardian.

By pushing for the 1.5C goal Figueres may get a broad majority support among the parties, but runs the risk of creating an unresolvable polarization between the smaller countries, the U.S., China, India, and Brazil. A polarization that may lead to a deadlock in negotiations. Besides, several climate scientists have told me that this is an unrealistic target given the level of GHG already accumulated in the atmosphere and the present path of emissions. Some of them think we’ve already passed even the point where the 2C limit would be feasible. Based on their opinion it seems that either 2C or 1.5C would only be achievable if we have better technology to capture GHG from the atmosphere, as Figueres suggested.

On the side of realistic statements, Figueres has finally acknowledged that an agreement is unlikely in Durban on the second period of commitment for the Kyoto Protocol. “Even if they were able to agree on a legal text”, she said, as Reuters reports, “that requires an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, it requires legislative ratifications on the part of three-quarters of the parties, so we would assume that there’s no time to do that between Durban and the end of 2012.” A post-2012 regulatory gap is already unavoidable, and may further destabilize the already fragile carbon market. There is a broad perception among climate negotiators that no binding agreement to replace Kyoto is likely to be agreed upon before 2015.

Negotiators are even more skeptical about getting any relevant outcome from Durban because of the attitude of the South African presidency. Critics say the presidency lacks initiative. No informal meeting has been organized so far to consult the parties on a viable set of decisions that could prevent COP17 from being a total failure.

Asked about this absentee presidency, Figueres said that “South Africa has been very carefully listening, trying to understand where there are commonalities and where the weaknesses are.” It seems too little given the amount of negotiations still required to reach a consensus on a few points.

Less developed countries are very concerned about the mitigation and adaptation fund. In spite of a commitment made in Copenhagen to implement the fund, and the decision made in Cancun to put it in place, there has been no institutionalization of the fund or disbursement of money. Finding a way to make the fund real could be a fair outcome for the Durban climate talks.

A qualified and active presidency is key to prevent failure of climate talks. The transparent and pluralistic informal meetings convened by the Mexican presidency of COP16 were decisive to get the Cancun Agreements. Prime Minister Rasmussen’s attitude in the presidency of COP15 has contributed in no small amount to the crisis of confidence among parties that led the Copenhagen final session to the well-known dismal ending.

Another critical factor at climate negotiations is some degree of understanding among countries that have a leading role in the different groups among which the Parties are organized: the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China); AOSIS (small island states); African Union; and Less Developed Countries. The three BASIC big players, the U.S., and the European  Union are always decisive players. If they reach some understanding with opinion makers among the other groups, and are able to take these countries’ major interests into account, some progress could be achieved. It is the COP presidency that has the political and institutional means to propitiate situations where this preliminary understanding could be pursued. Apparently this is not happening at all.

Years of deadlocks, paralysis, and muddling-through outcomes, if and when there is some progress, have led several analysts to propose that the UNFCCC ceases to be the main forum for global climate policy-making. Some of them defend the creation of an agency similar to the World Trade Organization to become the global climate change regulatory agency. Others think that sectoral agreements and bilateral deals could pave the way to a multilateral agreement encompassing all major carbon emitters. This deal could be done within G20, and be more effective and binding than any UN-sponsored agreement.

I agree that the UNFCCC is unlikely to yield a broad and bold binding agreement in any foreseeable future. Climate change challenges us to do the maximum possible under the present technological and social conditions, as well as to keep searching for stronger technological means, short of geoengineering. The UN rules could only lead to consensus around an acceptable minimum. But , its weaknesses notwithstanding, the UNFCCC still has an important role to play.

It creates an environment where the key actors of the global society can interact and learn the ways towards global democratic governance. Government officials, NGOs, scientists, business, and the media get together to debate all topics relevant to climate change. This continuous interactions create connections, networks, allowing  all players in this complex and decisive global political game to be exposed to each others’ views and values. It is an exercise fundamental to the future of democratic and pluralistic global governance without government. An important environment to test everyone’s capabilities to become a part of this cosmopolity, of this global poliarchy. Perhaps it is not the appropriate mechanism to provide us with a strong and binding legal framework for global action on climate change, but is is a necessary piece of this machinery, in itself a work in progress.

A scenario of sustained high oil prices can no longer be discarded. If the uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East continue to spread to other countries over the next months, it is quite likely that oil prices will keep high, and may even reach new record heights. Not an unlikely development, particularly if protesters in Libya succeed in overthrowing Gaddafi. But instability will hardly stop with the overthrow of dictatorial rulers. Governance-building is a long process, with likely surges of instability. Attending the demands for jobs and income will not be easy. The global economy has not fully recovered yet, and the region’s troubled local economies need sweeping reforms before they can yield satisfactory results. Frustration of demands can refuel discontent and lead to new waves of instability.

This environment of uncertainty and stress can have an enduring effect on oil prices, leading to a relatively long cycle with frequent upswings, before prices start to settle down. This scenario could further deteriorate if this wave of revolt reaches Saudi Arabia. It looks rock solid today, but its gerontocracy has little future left. Change might be inevitable. Instability in Saudi Arabia would very likely determine a higher floor to oil prices. The effect of Libya’s instability on oil prices has do to with oil quality, rather than with the quantity at risk. In Saudi Arabia it is the other way around, it is about quantity. Sustained high oil prices would jeopardize the still shaky economic recovery in Europe and the US. It would also feed inflation. Food inflation that has resulted from extreme weather events all over the world over the last 14 months would be refueled. There is a clear and present danger of a setback to economic recovery.

Continuar lendo: NatGeo Blogs: The Great Energy Challenge

Sergio Abranches

The uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East are unprecedented in many ways. There are no sufficiently comparable historical cases to help explaining them. They show a degree of spontaneous mobilization that can seldom be detected in social movements and political rebellions. Often political movements are characterized by high levels of militancy and the mediation of political organizations such as political parties and unions. Instead of a well defined political agenda, they have a clear, yet loosely articulated, set of primary demands: freedom; respect for human rights; jobs; income.These uprisings have no resemblance to national liberation movements (no foreign occupation), nor to the movements to establish conventional democratic governance in countries under authoritarian regimes, in the 1970‘s and 1980‘s, especially in South America. The re-democratization of South American countries then under military rule, was clearly organized around political parties and unions. The protesters don’t seem to have a common and clear notion about the kind of democratic governance they’re looking for. They want the new government to be honest, effective and non-repressive. This is not necessarily the same as demanding a conventional democratic regime.

The way a surge of student and youth protest turns into a mass movement strongly suggests a new form of social contagion.  Students and young people go to the streets to shout their discontent, they gain adherents continuously, the crowd on the streets starts to grow exponentially, and it turns into a mass movement in a matter of days. What leads the new waves of people to join the first-comers to the street protests? Contagion, through virtual connection at first, then reinforced by physical and emotional contact when they get together on the squares.

Social contagion is no knew phenomenon to sociologists. It started to be studied at the end of the 19^th century. The pioneer studies were Mark Baldwin’s on imitation; Gustave Lebon’s on the behavior of crowds; and  the very important work by Gabriel Tarde on public opinion. Tarde established communication as a central element in the formation of social movements. In his seminal “L’Opinion et la Foule”, (Opinion and the Crowd), Tarde differentiated opinion – a collective outcome – from individual perception. The major source of opinion formation was what he called “conversation”, exchange of information. He foresaw the media as the main vehicle for information diffusion, as the means for this conversation. Opinion was more than the sum of individual standpoints: it was a consciously shared view.

How do a mass movement emerge from contagion? There are several ways for contagion to lead to crowd formation. But what has happened in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and has been spreading to several other countries in the region has some quite distinctive elements when compared to those already identified by the conventional theories of social contagion. Anyway, no available explanation covers the whole process we are witnessing through the social media and the global TV and radio networks. This is a very complex social process. We might even been looking at a case of social emergence.

Contagion requires at least four basic elements to happen: people, context (environment), a contagious idea or sentiment – a “viral” element, or a meme – and contact. It begins with a group of pioneers displaying some unexpected behavior that expresses a viral idea or feeling. Contagion will happen and lead to exponential growth towards a mass movement if new groups make contact with the pioneers, and this enlarged group encounters new people they can “infect” with their ideas, and so on. For contagion to continue spreading, new groups of people need to be ‘touched‘ by those already mobilized (contaminated by the idea or feelings) continuously. Most of the social contagion theories claim that contagion could only take place through physical contact. What we’ve seen in these uprisings was that contagion could begin through virtual contact, the viral element can reach people through the virtual flow of information. The movement is sustained over time by reinforcement mechanisms that keep the people intoxicated by the viral emotions of the crowd.

Pioneer groups emerge and develop a “contagious potential” within certain contexts, a propitiating environment. In the case of these uprisings the environment of rage and frustration was clear: high youth unemployment, extreme income and wealth inequality, brutal oppression.

Social networks of the physical kind, before the emergence of digital networking, have long been considered by sociologists as the most efficient form of contact to enable contagion.

Evidence of this role of social networks has been found far before the Internet, digital social networks and social media. The historic episode that inspired Martin Scorsese’s Gangs of New York, was the object of economic and sociological investigation as an instance of social networking leading to extreme spontaneous collective action in mid 19^th century. A network had been built by Irish migrants coming to New York from the same small region of Ireland. A community so closed that the young men would ask relatives back at home to choose their future wives among girls from the city they’d left. Communication was intense, face to face, by word of mouth. In a context where a viral feeling could spread, in this case panic, there was a run on the two banks concentrating the cash deposits and savings of the Irish community. By the same token, resentment and prejudice could lead to rage and trigger gang wars.

Today, social networks and digital media, mobile technologies – videos, photos and SMS – global TV (CNN, Al Jazeera), and radio networks  accessible in English all over the world, on real time, through cable, the Web or satellite, have replaced word of mouth communication, and face to face contact. This virtual contact through information distribution and sharing would be enough, in the proper context, to take more people to the streets, where they’d get in touch with protesters and the final stage of contagion would take place.

Images and messages showing an increasing number of people on the streets would give a greater sense of safety to others and finally convince them to go out to express their own indignation. The mass of protesters would, then, expand by waves, through this flow that starts with virtual communication and ends on physical contact when newcomers to the streets get themselves mixed into the crowd. Contagion would spread and speed up through the virtual and mobile media. Virtual contact predisposes an increasing number of people to go to the streets and expose themselves to the physical contagion of the emotional mass of their fellow citizens.

It is possible to observe this new form of two-step contagion, where the virtual sphere creates the propensity to join the group outside in the physical world. It is contagion through identification with the strong emotional drive of the people on the streets. This identification lowers all barriers preventing people to join the protests, and they adhere to the movement, spontaneously, voluntarily.

When youngsters convince their parents to go to the streets with them, a new chain of identities is formed, allowing contagion across generations.  On CNN, an Egyptian mother said her generation had failed because they did not confront Mubarak’s dictatorship. Her son’s generation was doing the right thing, she said, and she felt compelled to go to the streets with them. When images of more mature people out on the streets start to show on the screens of Al Jazeera and CNN, on photos sent through SMS or posted on Flickr and similar social networks, other mature people are encouraged to join.

The same happened with women in general, and muslim women in particular. The first images of the manifestations were mostly of young males. After a few days, young females started to show. Mostly wearing western clothes. After some time muslim females wearing chador started to show. The crowd became progressively more diverse by age, gender, and creed.

The final images of the crowd on Tahrir square portrayed very clearly how contagion had cut across age, gender and religion.

Often the exposure to the viral feelings through the social media would be enough for contagion to happen. Social transmission of the “virus”, or “meme”, is clearly possible to occur through virtual media. That’s why the contention that Twitter and other social media would not lead revolutions is pointless. Of course not. But they certainly are a new and powerful infrastructure that expands and accelerates the spread of contagious ideas, attitudes and beliefs. Information flows through them beyond borders and hardly any barrier resists long enough to prevent news to reach almost everybody, everywhere.

The cost of closing the Net is immense. In Egypt it led to economic collapse. Logistics today is strongly dependent on the Web. It took Egyptian banks almost a week to recover and reorganize their data, interrupted by the Internet blackout, to be able to return to normal operations. The stock-exchange could not be reopened immediately also because of data loss during the blackout. Trade contracts could not be closed. Cargo shipments were delayed.

Social media are undoubtedly a powerful tool for spontaneous mobilization and acceleration of contagion. They give speed to the development of the social movement that today evolves faster than ever from a relatively small group protest to a mass uprising. They also allow, for the first time in history, the real time creation of a global safety net that, although unable to prevent all violence against protesters, exponentially increases the risk of sanctions and even intervention from foreign governments to stop bloodshed. Social media have become an essential element of the global “conversation”, allowing for fast dissemination of information, creating channels of virtual social contagion, and generating relevant global pressure against oppressors.

This global reach of the virtual conversation makes it much easier for contagion to move beyond borders. This is also a new phenomenon. There are historical examples of rebellion to cross the borders of neighboring countries, but never at the speed, nor to the extent we’ve seen happening from Tunisia to Bahrein. Besides, Tunisia, Yemen, Libya, Jordan, Morocco, and Bahrein are very different from each other in terms of size of population, structure of the economy, religious and ethnical composition. What they have in common is the context of oppression, frustration, and disheartenment. Irrespectively of their economic structure, they have high unemployment levels, especially among the youth, and extreme inequalities. In spite of the economic disparities, the educational level of the youth generation is higher, they are far better informed, and a significant portion has access to the Web, social media, social networks, and the global TV and radio networks. Context and media.

The fact that these mass manifestations are highly spontaneous and develop through contagion characterizes them as social, rather than political movements. It is true that their primary aim is to topple corrupt, oppressive, inefficient governments, but they are not moved by political motivations such as the desire for power, or to put a specific a group or party in power. They are not politically structured. They are not led by political organizations, such as parties or unions. Their agenda is both compact and generic. They want some non-tyrannical government to create opportunities for their social improvement. They cry for freedom, jobs, and income. They want to participate, to have a say on what happens to their lives and their nations. The future, after they win, is fully open. Who will lead them ahead is not clear, nor democracy is guaranteed.

Sergio Abranches

Who can influence the most climate change policies? Top economic policy-makers or environmental authorities? In any country of the world, economic policy-makers have far more power to lead us to a low carbon economy, than environmental policy-makers, both public and private. Hence the silence of Finance ministers on climate change is far more meaningful than the eloquence of environment ministers.

And silence was as heavy as the thickest fog ever in Paris at the close of the G20 finance ministers meeting, on February 19. The final communiqué has not a single phrase regarding either climate change or the economic costs and job destruction associated with of land, air, and water pollution.

The Finance ministers of the larger and most powerful economies of the developed and emerging world have used the word ‘sustainable’ only once, on a catch phrase, and in the wrong context. When interpreted by its proximity to other terms receiving greater emphasis, it becomes clear they were not talking about ‘sustainable’ growth, but about ‘sustained’ growth. They did not take notice of UNEP’s report “Towards a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication”, released to the public today, February 21, one day after the meeting closed in Paris, on Saturday. They have quoted a few ‘interim reports’, but have ignored OECD’s “Interim Report of the Green Growth Strategy: Implementing our Commitment for a Sustainable Future”. The workshop for the preparation of the final report was held in Paris just one week before the G20 meeting. The final report is to be presented to ministers at the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting in May 2011. Perhaps they’ll will be able convey the basic ideas to their cabinet mates and to their leaders at home this time. But there is less than a slim chance that the Finance ministers will, then, come to know a bit more about the synergy between economic recovery, job creation, poverty eradication and the transition to a low carbon, green economy.

The Paris Communiqué has nothing but the following paragraph to say regarding economic growth, and their priorities for economic policy.

“We reaffirm our commitment to coordinated policy action by all G20 members to achieve strong, sustainable and balanced growth. Our main priority actions include implementing medium term fiscal consolidation plans differentiated according to national circumstances in line with our Toronto commitment, pursuing appropriate monetary policy, enhancing exchange rate flexibility to better reflect underlying economic fundamentals and structural reforms, to sustain global demand, increase potential growth, foster job creation and contribute to global rebalancing.”

The communiqué expresses high concern about food price volatility, but sees this volatility as part of the larger movement of commodity prices. Within this broader framing it gives far more importance to price instability of oil, gas, and coal. It also takes a strictly financial viewpoint of food price volatility.

On commodity price volatility, the communiqué says that:

“We discussed concerns about consequences of potential excessive commodity price volatility and asked our deputies to work with international organizations and to report back to us on the underlying drivers and the challenges posed by these trends for both consumers and producers and consider possible actions. Keeping in mind the impact of this volatility on food security, we reiterated the need for long-term investment in the agricultural sector in developing countries.”

Reiteration is just a metaphoric way to admit either that ‘nobody listened when we said it before’, or ‘we never really meant that to happen anyway’. The fact that they are reiterating a position about something that is factual amounts to an implicit admission of failure. By readdressing the need for long-term investment in the agriculture of developing countries they are admitting that this investment has not occurred in spite of their previous recommendation. There is no mention whatsoever to the vulnerability of most of the developing countries’ agricultural activities to climate change as well as to land degradation and water scarcity. The Finance ministers have also failed to see the damage to Africa’s agriculture done by agricultural subsidies in developed countries, especially in the European Union.

There is no indication in the communiqué that the Finance ministers have been informed of the effect of  extreme weather on food prices. Extreme weather has hit major portions of the agricultural areas of North and South America, Africa, and Australia. It is quite hard not to have noticed it, even more so, when there is an explicit concern about ‘food security’.

The communiqué has also disregarded that rising prices of fossil fuels could be a strong incentive to investment in low carbon, clean energy. This investment is a better hedge against fuel price volatility, than any intervention in the oil, gas, and coal markets. This Monday, February 21, the price of Brent oil opened at US$ 104,26 a barrel due to events in Libya. It seems no Finance minister has ever read studies showing how clean investment and clean energy could help to effectively address the financial crisis. Or how high oil prices could help a greener economic recovery. Some say that  US$ 100,00 a barrel is the break-even point to the transition to a low carbon economy.

The G20 Paris communiqué mentions several organizations investigating the drivers of fuel price volatility. But the organizations  that are dedicated to understanding food price volatility are treated by the anonymous collective expression “relevant international organizations”. It seems that they are only worried about speculation with agricultural commodity derivatives. Perhaps as a result of pressure from the french presidency inaugurated on the Paris meeting.

“We welcomed the interim report by the IEF, IEA and OPEC to improve the quality, timeliness and reliability of the Joint Organization Data Initiative Oil (JODI oil) and call for further work on strategies to implement these recommendations to be detailed in their final report. Building on the Riyadh symposium held on January 24th, we encourage the IEF to provide concrete strategies to improve the producer-consumer dialogue at its next meeting on February 22nd 2011. Following our Leaders’ request, we call on the IMF and IEF, as well as IEA, GECF and OPEC, to develop by October 2011 concrete recommendations to extend the G20’s work on oil price volatility to gas and coal. We look forward to discussing at our next meeting the report of IEF, IEA, OPEC and IOSCO on price reporting agencies as well as the interim report on food security currently being undertaken by the relevant international organizations, and IOSCO’s recommendations, and the FSB’s consideration of next steps, on regulation and supervision of commodity derivatives markets notably to strengthen transparency and address market abuses.”

The absence of any concern about climate change, about the effects of economic activity on the environment, as well as about the impact of a damaged environment on economic activity at the center of economic policy design is an indicator of a ongoing conservative setback on global climate policy. It is very worrisome that Finance ministers feel comfortable to disregard  studies like those released by the OECD and UNEP on green economics and the costs and benefits of a transition to a low carbon economy. It is also disquieting that UNEP chose to release its new report on the green economy this Monday, one day after the G20 meeting closed in Paris. This report estimates the transition costs to a green economy at 2% of GDP per year. The ‘green economy’ is defined as “one which is low carbon, resource efficient and socially inclusive”. Far from the vague idea of sustainability adopted by the G20 communiqué.

This difference is even more striking regarding ‘food security’. It would be really great if the G20 leaders were to recommend their Finance ministers to read this:

“As regards to food security, we are seeing neither widespread understanding of the nature of the problem, nor globally collaborative solutions for how we shall feed a population of 9 billion by 2050. Freshwater scarcity is already a global problem, and forecasts suggest a growing gap by 2030 between annual freshwater demand and renewable supply. The outlook for improved sanitation still looks bleak for over 2.6 billion people; 884 million people still lack access to clean drinking water. Collectively, these crises are severely impacting our ability to sustain prosperity worldwide and to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for reducing extreme poverty. They are compounding persistent social problems from job losses, socio economic insecurity and poverty, and threatening social stability.

Although the causes of these crises vary, at a fundamental level they all share a common feature: the gross misallocation of capital. During the last two decades, much capital was poured into property, fossil fuels and structured financial assets with embedded derivatives, but relatively little in comparison was invested in renewable energy, energy efficiency, public transportation, sustainable agriculture, ecosystem and biodiversity protection, and land and water conservation.”

There is a deadly mismatch between what the political commanding heights of the global economy are saying about growth, and the evidence about the outcomes of the present path of global growth. While the major developed and emerging economies of the world insist on short-term, low quality global economic growth, societies are already facing the burden of the lack of sound and working economic strategies for development in the 21^st century.

Sergio Abranches

Today I saw a Retweet that reminded me of something I thought, and afterwards wrote about, many years ago. The RT by @paulegina (a.k.a Paule Wendelberger), a US citizen born in Haiti, living and working for more than 20 years in Germany (www.wendelberger.com), quoted a Tweet by @wsteffie (a.k.a Stefanie W) conveniently located in “Cyberspace”. Her bio is both a demand and a statement of belief: “human rights for all, and social democracy can work if we all act responsibly.” Her Tweet reads: “@TIME is just teaching us about American Democracy: Ask the people to vote & then screw them!”

The Tweet was about Time Magazine choosing Mark Zuckerberg rather than Julian Assange as Person of the Year. The Twittersphere reports that Assange, Wikileaks mentor and principal person, got 382,000 votes against 18,000 to Mark Zuckerberg, founder of  Facebook. Time magazine’s ranking based on the poll confirms.

But the recollection the RT brought to my mind has nothing to do with TIME’s choices. It was about the view of US democracy on Stefanie W’s Tweet, and the fact it gets an approving quote from another person from the USA living in an European social democracy.

Both Zuckerberg and Assange are controversial characters of their own. Zuckerberg’s nomination is not without merit. Facebook is an important addition to network life. And so is Wikileaks, to network life and journalism. However, Assange’s achievements and predicament this year clearly make him the winner, regarding both relevance and news content. The choice of Person of the Year by a news magazine would seem outright.

I know, the “democracy thing” was to be the lede and I have not spelled it so far. The “democracy thing” is a paradox: there seems to be a permanently high degree of dissatisfaction with how democracy works everywhere at any time; but no society has yet come up with an alternative regime. One that ensures at least as much freedom as a mature democracy does, and works better overall than existing democracies.

I met this paradox almost physically many years ago when I was at Notre Dame University for a brief tenure as senior visiting fellow of the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies. I was a young scholar, had gotten my PhD four years before. A group attending a Congress of the International Political Science Association decided to organize this conference on comparative democracy. We should compare democracies, or the “democratic problem”, in Latin America, the US and Europe. I wrote a critique of liberal democracies called “Neither citizens nor free persons: the political dilemma of liberal democracies”. It was a defense of social democracy. The essay was inspired by a paradoxical sequence of feelings I had when I arrived in Chicago, on my way to South Bend. Brazil was slowly moving out of a two-decade long period of military rule. Several friends of mine were still in exile. A few were killed by the ruthless authoritarian government. Being free to speak my mind, to openly discuss issues that were dangerous to bring to public debate in Brazil made me feel exhilarating. After a few hours discussing the shortcomings of US democracy and listening to US liberals’ (in the US sense) complaints about democracy under Ronald Reagan, I though: “well it is far better than a dictatorship, but it doesn’t seem to be enough.”

As I see it today, US Democracy has become far more progressive with Barack Obama than it was with George W. Bush. In the previous administration there were clear and dangerous setbacks for democracy, both domestically and globally. Obama has a tolerant and open-minded political personality. I’ve been to the US several times since 9/11, and the whole environment shows less stress and uneasiness now. I have friends in Germany that are convinced social democracy is not working there. I have heard from British people that democracy is utterly dysfunctional in the UK. The attitude of the Courts on Assange’s case does not bode well to British democracy. The French have always complained about French democracy, and continue to do so. French society is again “enragée” with its democracy and government. Talk to Italians about their democracy, especially after Berlusconi got the vote of confidence, and one’ll probably get a torrent of Italian imprecations as answer. Last year I’ve spent a few months in Toronto, and have been to Montréal. Canadians are not happy with their democracy. I will spare you opinions about Latin American democracies.

Are we dissatisfied with our democracies or with our governments? The right answer is both. But more with the governments, than with democracy in itself. The problems with governments we all know. They’re usually related to economic and territorial management, pressing current domestic issues, foreign affairs. The problems with democracy are more difficult to grasp, they are less tangible. Democracy nonetheless seems in disarray everywhere.

Part of the problem comes, very likely, from a permanent mismatch between desire, or, more properly, expectations and the performance of democracy. In other words, frustration with what democracy has managed to deliver is rampant. Democracy is a process and, as such, it can improve or decay. Usually it does have ups and downs. It seems fair to say that it is on a phase of decay. There is no final stage for the process of “democratic development”. It is a moving target. And it depends on the engagement of civil society to make any progress towards this target. Democracy decays when civil society is not engaged, is not aiming higher.

Democracy has not adapted yet to the new technological revolution – of which Facebook and Wikileaks are an offspring – to globalization, climate change, new waves of migration and a basketful of new issues and processes that will be the building blocks of this century’s history.

Adam Przeworski, born in Poland, a US Citizen, and very successful scholar, now teaching political science at NYU, was at the conference in Notre Dame. During the discussions, to my amazement, he reacted to my paper saying he couldn’t understand why I didn’t stress the role of the party as one of the major elements of the dilemma of liberal democracies. I did not understand, at the time, how someone could envisage democracy without political parties. At the time I believed that political parties were an essential element of democracies.

My first impression was that Adam invested against the party because it clearly was an instrument of oppression and privilege in communist regimes. This discussion took place seven years before their demise. It was also an instrument of oppression and privilege in authoritarian regimes. Like in Mexico, when the PRI was the only party. The party machinery and the state apparatus were intertwined. That much I was prepared to admit: party bureaucracies having promiscuous and non-competitive linkages to the state structure were a clear and present danger to democracy. I was also prepared to accept Peter Bachrach’s concept of “democratic elitism”, or E. E. Schattschneider’s idea of a semi-sovereign people. I have read their books in graduate school, and dealt with them in my essay. But I was not prepared to toss parties in the garbage can of political history.

It took me some time to understand that there was a deeper truth to Adam’s argument. The political party is an outdated technology of representative democracy. A necessary contraption, perhaps, before the advent of the network society. Today they do belong into the garbage can of political history. But, again, what will replace the parties? Will parliaments still make sense without parties? Is deliberation better than representation, even when we know how unequal is the distribution of knowledge, information, and education? Is legitimate and democratic deliberation possible in the absence of civic education, or in a situation it is declining? A civic culture, or social capital, or whatever one likes to call this “spirit of citizenship” is a sine qua non for truly democratic and participatory deliberations. This sentiment of belonging and togetherness, of collective responsibility is indispensable to what Machiavelli has called the “virtuous republic”. Today we would call it full-citizenship, or responsible citizenship, aware of both its rights and obligations, capable of a high degree of self-government.

Yes, back to Utopia to fight dystopias. We ought to fight democratic decay. That much is clear. We’ve got to bring to political life the new technologies and practices we use in our private and collective everyday life to our own benefit, our new forms of socializing, debating, exchanging ideas, seeking knowledge information and references.

So it has to do with Zuckerberg, Assange, Facebook and Wikileaks after all. We have, in several ways, a more democratic social exchange in the network society than in political society. We’ve got to bridge this gap moving towards more political democracy. But let’s not fool ourselves: we all live in a private and collective world of micro-tyrannies, prejudice, and exclusion. These social micro behaviors are also present in the Websphere. We won’t have more political democracy without democratizing private and collective life. We’ve got to take the network society to higher levels of openness and equal exchange. Nobody will do that for us. Certainly not the power-holders in both government and opposition. Political parties will not be a part of this (re)volution, they don’t belong into this future.

This process of permanently improving democracy, preventing its decay, and transforming it from the inside out, from top to bottom, to design a legitimate and functional regime for this century is a task for us all. It is a global endeavor. A collective challenge. A network mission. We have the technology and the dissatisfaction to begin with. But can we do it?

PS.

I know tons of theories have been written about this “democracy thing”, the network society, and everything else. But I am afraid we have been theorizing too much among ourselves, like a tribe of pundits, and have lost the praxis, as a collective body.

Sergio Abranches

Politics and climate are often at odds with each other. The best scientific evidence shows a continuous and accelerating trend towards climate change. Each year of inaction represents higher costs in the future.

We’ll have to face the unavoidable climatic consequences of past GHG accumulation, and will have to scale up the effort to reduce the risk of cataclysmic scenarios. Politics are far more influenced by short run shifting contexts, than by long run trends. If an event of the magnitude of Katrina reached each major player of global climate politics every year, appropriate decisions would come quick and easy. But, fortunately these events seldom repeat on an yearly sequence and everywhere at the same time. But they are indeed becoming more frequent.

Shifts and turns in the political and economic realms are far more frequent. Weakening cabinet support, losses in midterm elections, economic downturns have far more influence  on political and corporate decision-making around the world. The pressing demands of unemployment, poverty, consumption upgrading or downgrading are stronger than the far more dangerous claims about climate change. Even though unmitigated climate change would impede economic growth, and increase unemployment and poverty.

Things are even more complex because political and economic shifting contexts may frequently contradict each other or, even worse, reinforce each other in the wrong direction. The economic contexts of 2005 or 2006, for instance, were more positive to climate change decision-making than the circumstances of 2009 or 2010. That is to say, the economic contexts of COP11, in Montréal, or COP12, in Nairobi, were much better than the economic conditions under which COP13 (Bali), COP14 (Posnan), and COP15 (Copenhagen) took place. The latter were all marked by the subprime crisis or its aftershocks. But the political conditions for a climate agreement in 2005 or 2006 were not good at all. The U.S. had a contrarian attitude under the Bush administration. The governments of China, India, and Brazil were not yet convinced they should accept any commitment for reducing their carbon emissions. The political context was too negative for the major players and carbon emitters outside the reach of the Kyoto Protocol to decide on a global climate agreement.

This mismatch of the economic and political circumstances has also happened in Copenhagen, the other way around. The political context had changed for the better in the U.S. with the Obama administration and its debut at the UNFCCC talks. China, India and Brazil changed their noncommittal attitude in the months prior to the Copenhagen Summit. All three arrived in Copenhagen after having disclosed the voluntary emissions reductions pledges they were willing to bring to the table of negotiations. But the crisis in the developed world wasn’t over, and there were signs it was worsening again.

What about Cancun? The mismatch is over but, alas, in the wrong direction: the political context has taken a negative turn in many countries. Obama has lost the midterm elections, and Congress has dismissed the climate and clean energy bill. Lula’s term is  only five weeks to go. The president-elect, Dilma Rousseff is far less committed to the idea of Brazil taking responsibility for mitigation efforts. There is a lot of stress impairing concerted economic and political action in the EU. In Germany, Angela Merkel’s coalition is barely holding together, and the Chancellor is losing popular support. In France, Nicholas Sarkozy is facing cyclical outbursts of social unrest. In the UK, the new coalition government’s expenditure cuts are raising uneasiness among the population. Besides, they have badly hit climate change and scientific programs. In China, a two-year process of power transition raises some uncertainty about the present government’s propensity to support a more effective climate pact.

The economic context is even more negative. The crisis in the U.S. is far from over. Unemployment is too high. Signs of recovery are faint, at the very best. The Eurozone is in danger of falling apart. Conservative fiscal policies in the UK are likely to delay economic recovery. Portugal and Spain are in dire straits. Conflict of economic interest between the U.S. and China is on the rise. A currency war leads to greater monetary imbalances among countries, making it more difficult for them to cooperate towards a concerted solution. Cooperation in other complex policy areas becomes far more difficult when countries fail to reach a common understanding of global or regional economic issues.

What should we expect looking at the adverse context awaiting Cancun’s climate talks?

Certainly not the broad, conclusive agreement we have failed to get in Copenhagen. There are, however, some open tracks under the present circumstances. One of them, very few people are talking about, would be to make the Copenhagen Accord official. In Copenhagen, the plenary took note of it. A save-face solution. Now, its terms have been accepted as part of the LCA document. The plenary of COP16 could approve it as a voluntary agreement, not a legally binding one, but under official umbrella of the Climate Convention.

Why should we do that? Because it is the first ever agreement within the Climate Convention that has been fully supported by the U.S. China, India, Brazil, the European Union, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, and a few others. All full members of the “high-carbon club”. A study UNEP has just released shows the gap between the Copenhagen emission reduction pledges and what is needed to keep warming at the vicinity of 2^oC. It has a best-case scenario in which what is lacking could be supplemented using existing technologies. The data also shows that the countries associated to the Copenhagen Accord, with registered pledges, represent a higher volume of carbon emissions than the aggregate emissions of Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol. The Accord is voluntary, but would be even more legitimate, accountable and prone to global social control if it becomes official. The Accord has already been negotiated and approved by the heads of states and governments. Making it an official UN document is a smaller step.

There are, additionally, issues related to the Copenhagen Accord that still need to be clarified and approved. Some are for the short-run. The  fast-track section of the financial mechanism was decided but wasn’t implemented. It could be updated and its implementation rescheduled and disbursement to the less developed countries ensured. Some are for the future. The MRV mechanism, for instance, that enabled the Accord at the last-hour negotiations between Obama and the BASIC countries still lacks a methodology that adequately expresses what has been agreed upon.

Another track that could yield good results would be to concentrate on mid to long term issues that are still undecided, preparing them for a final decision under a more positive future context. Problem solving and conflict resolution could make progress if one knows that no decisions are to be implemented immediately, but only after a full agreement is decided upon. Taking a longer, less pressing view could help to remove deadlocks and create some incentive to cooperation.

There still is a chance for Cancun to become a milestone on the path towards a good future global climate agreement.

Sergio Abranches

The leaders of the G20 have pledged that they “will spare no effort to reach a balanced and successful outcome in Cancun.” Will this really come through?

It is clearly on the G20’s power to lead Cancun to deliver sound outcomes. But will they use this power? The leaders of the member countries have included a supposedly strong paragraph on the Climate Talks in the final ‘Declaration of the Seoul Summit’. They said that:

“We reaffirm our resolute commitment to fight climate change, as reflected in the Leaders’ Seoul Summit Document. We appreciate President Felipe Calderón’s briefing on the status of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change negotiations, as well as Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s briefing on the report of the High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing submitted to the UN Secretary-General. We will spare no effort to reach a balanced and successful outcome in Cancun.”

From the Seoul Declaration

To have a hint of what they might do in Cancun we should first look at what they’ve done about the global currency disequilibrium in Seoul. This crisis is a more pressing problem, one that requires prompt, coordinated action. The economic diagnosis of the present imbalances is clear, so are their causes. The actions to be taken are well known and have already proved to work in more than one occasion. All that said, one should expect a clear, direct, practical and operational statement about what is to be done, by whom and within which timeframe. Not a diplomatic note written to suit any circumstance whatsoever and giving everyone an excuse to opt out.

The decision-making setting is very similar to the climate change one. Typically a situation the players say to each other: “I’ll do it if you do more of it”, or “I’ll do my part after you’ve done yours”. Positions are framed on the basis of each ones’ appraisal of everyone else’s ‘primary responsibility’ for what happened as well as for what continues to happen. This is a game that has no optimal solution, only suboptimal ones. In other words a situation that leads to the decision to muddle-through.

Let’s look at what the leaders have put on paper about fiscal policies, financial reforms and monetary and exchange rate policies, the three pronged policy requirements to adequately face the crisis:

“Fiscal Policies: Advanced economies will formulate and implement clear, credible, ambitious and growth-friendly medium-term fiscal consolidation plans in line with the Toronto commitment, differentiated according to national circumstances. We are mindful of the risk of synchronized adjustment on the global recovery and of the risk that failure to implement consolidation, where immediately necessary, would undermine confidence and growth.

Financial Reforms: We are committed to take action at the national and international level to raise standards, and ensure that our national authorities implement global standards developed to date, consistently, in a way that ensures a level playing field, a race to the top and avoids fragmentation of markets, protectionism and regulatory arbitrage. In particular, we will implement fully the new bank capital and liquidity standards and address too-big-to-fail problems. We agreed to further work on financial regulatory reforms.

Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies: We reaffirm the importance of central banks’ commitment to price stability, thereby contributing to the recovery and sustainable growth. We will move toward more market-determined exchange rate systems and enhance exchange rate flexibility to reflect underlying economic fundamentals and refrain from competitive devaluation of currencies. Advanced economies, including those with reserve currencies, will be vigilant against excess volatility and disorderly movements in exchange rates. Together these actions will help mitigate the risk of excessive volatility in capital flows facing some emerging market economies.

Nonetheless, in circumstances where countries are facing undue burden of adjustment, policy responses in emerging market economies with adequate reserves and increasingly overvalued flexible exchange rates may also include carefully designed macro-prudential measures. We will reinvigorate our efforts to promote a stable and well functioning international monetary system and call on the IMF to deepen its work in these areas.”

From The Seoul Summit Document: Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth

The paragraphs above need no comment. The Seoul Summit has failed to decide on a clear set of concrete actions to tackle the so-called “currency war”. The detailing paragraphs deal with what has been done – to no avail – what has been decided, and has not been implemented, and future work. A well known story of leaders making vague commitments at global fora, not taking any strong action back home, only to meet again to promise to implement what they’ve failed to implement before. This was exactly what happened with the “fast-start” finance agreed upon in Copenhagen. It was decided and not delivered.

Now, why should we expect that the G20 leaders will be more affirmative and decided in Cancun? Why should we expect Cancun to be more successful than Seoul, and to go beyond Copenhagen?

The leaders were generous on words and promises drafting the climate change-related  paragraphs of the Seoul Document. On fossil fuel subsidies, a clear and straightforward measure that could help accelerate the transition to a low carbon economy, they approved the following statement:

“Fossil Fuel Subsidies: We reaffirm our commitment to rationalize and phase-out over the medium term inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption, with timing based on national circumstances, while providing targeted support for the poorest. We direct our Finance and Energy Ministers to report back on the progress made in implementing country-specific strategies and in achieving the goals to which we agreed in Pittsburgh and Toronto at the 2011 Summit in France.” From The Seoul Summit Document: Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth

“Medium term” and “timing based on national circumstances” give any country a legitimate exit option based on the subjective interpretation of “medium” and “circumstances”. Chance of achievement near zero.

Here’s what they said about climate change and the low carbon economy:

“Climate Change and Green Growth: Addressing the threat of global climate change is an urgent priority for all nations. We reiterate our commitment to take strong and action-oriented measures and remain fully dedicated to UN climate change negotiations. We reaffirm the objective, provisions, and the principles of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), including common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. We thank Mexico for hosting the UNFCCC negotiations to be held in Cancun beginning at the end of November 2010. Those of us who have associated with the Copenhagen Accord reaffirm our support for it and its implementation. We all are committed to achieving a successful, balanced result that includes the core issues of mitigation, transparency, finance, technology, adaptation, and forest preservation. In this regard, we welcome the work of the High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing established by the UN Secretary-General and ask our Finance Ministers to consider its report. We also support and encourage the delivery of fast-start finance commitments.

The ongoing loss of biodiversity is a global environmental and economic challenge. Both climate change and loss of biodiversity are inextricably linked. We acknowledge the outcomes of the global study on the economics of ecosystems and biodiversity. We welcome the successful conclusion of COP10 in Nagoya.

We are committed to support country-led green growth policies that promote environmentally sustainable global growth along with employment creation while ensuring energy access for the poor. We recognize that sustainable green growth, as it is inherently a part of sustainable development, is a strategy of quality development, enabling countries to leapfrog old technologies in many sectors, including through the use of energy efficiency and clean technology. To that end, we will take steps to create, as appropriate, the enabling environments that are conducive to the development and deployment of energy efficiency and clean energy technologies, including policies and practices in our countries and beyond, including technical transfer and capacity building.

We support the ongoing initiatives under the Clean Energy Ministerial and encourage further discussion on cooperation in R&D and regulatory measures, together with business leaders, and ask our Energy Experts Group to monitor and report back to us on progress at the 2011 Summit in France. We also commit to stimulate investment in clean energy technology, energy and resource efficiency, green transportation, and green cities by mobilizing finance, establishing clear and consistent standards, developing long-term energy policies, supporting education, enterprise and R&D, and continuing to promote cross-border collaboration and coordination of national legislative approaches.”

From The Seoul Summit Document: Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth

A mix of diplomatic literature and promises without any real action behind.

“We also support and encourage the delivery of fast-start finance commitments.” Fast-start finance was decided by these same leaders – with the exception of the UK PM – in Copenhagen, and was to be fully available in the beginning of this year. Nothing happened. Is it really the case to say that the leaders support and encourage its delivery? Isn’t it a matter of simply writing some checks?

The elements that might help us to make an educated guess about the likely outcome at Cancun are not on global summit communiqués or on what happened at UNFCCC’s preparatory meetings. We should look for them in the realm of domestic politics. The relevant question is whether there has been any significant change in the domestic political circumstances that might affect the major developed and emerging players’ attitude at the climate talks.

The answer is yes for a handful of powerful players. In the U.S., president Obama has lost the majority in the House, barely managed to maintain a slim advantage in the Senate, and now leads a “divided government”. Congress is far more hostile to climate change policies than it was before, when Obama wasn’t able to pull a clean energy bill.

In the UK, the new coalition has imposed harmful budget cuts to the environment, climate change and scientific programs. I talked to a Cambridge professor who heads a low carbon economy program and he told me they’re loosing their best people and that he expects “a lot of change” for the worse because of the budget cuts. The director of a British private organization that provides consultancy and finance to business low carbon initiatives told me his company has also been hit by the cuts. They’re streamlining plans and loosing people.

The European Union is entangled in the fiscal and financial crises of many of its members. In France, president Sarkozy faces increasing social unrest. In Germany, Angela Merkel looses popularity and fights to keep her coalition together. (Reuters has just released a very interesting Special on chancellor Merkel.)

In Brazil, Lula’s former Chief of Staff, Dilma Rousseff, has been elected president. She masterminded the huge government investment program known as the “PAC” (Plan to Accelerate Growth). Almost every project in the program has a very high carbon footprint. In Copenhagen, as head of the Brazilian delegation, minister Rousseff, now president-elect, has impeded the delegation to have an effective role in the negotiations. The Brazilian position has only changed after president Lula arrived.

I have analyzed in detail what happened with the major players in Copenhagen in my last book Copenhague Antes e Depois.

The most important lesson from Copenhagen was that leaders will commit globally to what they have negotiated domestically, not the other way around. This means that the goals and commitments of a global agreement have to be politically approved at the domestic level beforehand. Only then can they be more significant than those decided in Copenhagen. Only when these commitments become domestic laws will they have a better chance of being implemented and enforced. A binding global compact without a corresponding set of national laws is very unlikely. Look at the Kyoto Protocol. It is an international law, but is it really binding? What power ensures its enforcement? The European Union is ahead of the rest of the World because it has a binding domestic program for emissions reduction in force.

What we can expect from Cancun is progress focused on some areas, building a bridge for more objective future talks. No real change is likely to happen before the global economic disequilibrium is effectively addressed. No country or group of countries will make further commitments at global meetings, before they approve them domestically.

It is unlikely that president Obama will be able to negotiate any meaningful climate change bill with the recently elected Congress. We’ll probably have to wait to see whether he can get reelected. Once reelected and if the economic situation improves, than he may have a new chance at persuading Congress to vote a climate change bill.

It is unlikely that president Dilma Rousseff will be more supportive of environment and climate change policies than she was as Lula’s all-powerful chief of staff and chief policy coordinator.

There are no new facts that would lead the Chinese leadership to change attitude in Cancun. And nobody really knows what may happen to Chinese global climate change politics when a new leadership, under the presidency of the Xi Jinping, comes to power in 2012.

All major players have reason to keep the same position they had in Copenhagen. It is unlikely that Cancun will go any farther than Copenhagen did. It will probably be a “bridge meeting”, one that takes us, more or less unharmed, to the next season of negotiations.

Sérgio Abranches

The election of Dilma Rousseff, Lula’s personal pick and former top aide, as next President of Brazil will trigger several important political shifts in the country.

The president-elect, once in office, will face challenges much harder than Lula has ever faced in the Presidency. For the first time someone without previous political experience and leadership will be seating legitimately on the presidential desk with full power.

The Brazilian system of governance is a presidential coalition government. Congress is strong, almost every policy the President plans to enforce requires a law authorizing or enabling the policy. The President has the power to initiate legislation, but the majority to approve presidential initiatives depends on a multiparty coalition in both Houses of Congress. President-elect Dilma Rousseff has said that her multiparty electoral alliance will become her governing coalition. This is not an automatic process, though. It requires a lot of political bargaining around ministerial posts, offices in the second and third tiers of government, as well as shares in the budget. The larger the representation of the pork barrel-seeking parties in the coalition, the harder it is to strike a deal. The major clientele-oriented party in her coalition, PMDB, is a federation of bosses of state party machines, very difficult to hold together and utterly ungovernable under stress. This process of coalition formation requires plenty of political savvy and bargaining skills. It will clearly be president-elect Rousseff’s first major test.

Looking to the bigger picture, the most important outcomes of this electoral process are the changes it trigers.

First of all, there will be a tremendous change of style. President Lula is a mobilization leader and he has relied almost 100% on the motivational dimension of the relationship between the Presidency and the people. He has never acted as a dedicated chief executive officer. He was more like a strategic leader. He spent more time on public events, such as inauguration of public projects and new plants of private corporations, celebrations, fairs and conventions, and on international travels, than at the office. He has a highly developed political instinct that balances his political shortcomings, and compensates for his lack of interest on the daily routines of the Presidency.

President-elect Dilma has so far proved to have no mobilization skills, and to be a poor motivational speaker. She is the kind of office-centered CEO. She likes to look into the details, and is unlikely to delegate as much as Lula did. One should not expect her Chief of Staff to be as powerful and independent a Chief of Staff as she was under president Lula. She has a more formal techno-bureaucratic attitude that will very soon contrast with Lula’s streetwise style of motivational presidency.

A second important difference is that Dilma is more ideological and less pragmatic than Lula has ever been. Lula was an AFL-CIO type of union leader, far different from the socialist and communist European union leaders of the 1960’s and 1970’s. Dilma still likes to think herself as belonging to what she calls “the camp of the left”. She has updated her views, as almost everybody in the left has done, but she is very likely less flexible than Lula.

Third, Lula was greater than PT and Dilma is smaller than the party. She owns her election far more to Lula’s popularity than to her political skills and capabilities to communicate with voters. She also has a temper and that may generate stress and friction as PT will try to impose party controls on her presidency.

PT, the Workers’ Party, is entering a whole new stage of its political life. For the first time  since 1989 it will not have Lula running a presidential campaign. Lula ran for the presidency in 1989, 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2006, being elected in the last two. From 1990 to 2002, Lula led the opposition. Over the last eight years he was the President of the Nation. Perhaps even Lula himself is uncertain about what he will be doing from January 2^nd, 2011 onwards.

The immediate challenge will be how to host a former president, known for his voluntarism and lack of personal discipline. Lula’s informality has led him to breach all democratic limits to the role an incumbent President could have on a presidential campaign to support his candidate. He disqualified the opposition, and used the government apparatus and state-owned companies to favor the official candidate. He always acts on impulse and instinct alone, and he seems to need public attention all the time. This phase of Lula being out of the Presidential office will be a testing one to Lula, the Party, and president Dilma Rousseff for quite some time. He may cast a giant shadow over the new government and the party as well.

Although Lula cannot be discarded as a presidential candidate in 2014, the Workers’ Party will have at some point to start looking for new leaders and to design feasible alternative courses for party life without Lula. “Lulism” will always remain a factor beyond the party’s reach as long as Lula stays on active political life. And the President is giving no signs that he will simply retire. The moment Lula recedes into the background the party will start facing stress and competition among its several internal factions.

At the same time, PT will also have to deal with the growth of competitors on the center-left side of the political spectrum. PSB, the Brazilian Socialist Party, has elected six state governors. PT elected 5. PSB’s parliamentary gains weren’t that significant, the party elected 34 representatives, and four senators. But it has more political leaders able to run a competitive presidential campaign than PT. Some were elected state governors. The critical aspect is that to put in place checks and balances on the power and influence of PMDB, the major clientele-oriented party on the new coalition, PT and Dilma will have to amplify PSB’s influence and power.

PT will not be alone on the road towards a new and yet unknown future. Its main adversary, the social democratic PSDB, is also on that road, even though heading to a different destination. With José Serra’s second failure on a presidential pledge – he ran against Lula in 2002 – the party’s founding fathers from the state of São Paulo will loose ground. The São Paulo section, once led by former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso, has been the hegemonic force within the party since its creation. Now it ran out of alternatives. Its other leader, Geraldo Alckmin, who ran against Lula in 2006, was elected governor of the state of São Paulo, defeating PT and Lula’s candidate, former senator Aloizio Mercadante. But the party does not look at Alckmin as its champion to run the 2014 presidential elections.

All eyes have already turned to former governor of the state of Minas Gerais, now elected senator, Aécio Neves. Two other politicians from the party’s second generation, i.e. the generation after the founding fathers, were elected governors of their states: Beto Richa, governor-elect of the southern state of Paraná, and Marconi Perillo, elected governor of the midwestern state of Goiás. Richa was the mayor of the capital city of Paraná, Curitiba. His father, José Richa, already deceased, was one of the party’s most influential founding fathers, celebrated for his political savvy. Marconi Perillo is a senator, he has been governor before, and now has defeated the powerful machine of PMDB in his state, running against the party’s boss Íris Resende. Resende was publicly and strongly supported by President Lula. The president deeply resented Perillo’s role in the Senate as a fierce opponent to himself and his government. He played a strong role accusing Lula of direct participation in the scandal of political corruption known as “mensalão”. The scandal negatively marked Lula’s first term. It involved monthly payments to parties in Congress to buy their allegiance to the government. It is under judicial review and there are 40 former members of Lula’s government and PT officials being prosecuted, among them the still influential, former party Secretary-General and Lula’s first Chief of Staff, José Dirceu.

Both PT and PSDB are on the verge of a power transition and will also experience a process of power diffusion. For PT, the transition and diffusion of power will take longer, because Lula will continue to hold most of the power and influence in the party and outside it. For PSDB, transition and diffusion will move faster. First there will be a transition of power from São Paulo’s leadership towards Aécio Neves. He will clearly attract the majority of the Party’s active forces, that see him as their best bet for 2014. Although Neves will likely be the major political attractor within the party, power will also be more decentralized, and we should expect Richa, Perillo, the new governor of Minas Gerais, Antonio Anastasia and other emerging social democrat leadership to become more influential and to have a stronger voice in the party’s decisions. Power will become more diffused within the party.

The first presidential election without Lula as a candidate will cause major waves of change. It wouldn’t be an exaggeration to put up an alert for a political tsunami. Large tectonic plates under the ground of Brazil’s two major parties are already shifting and moving. These undercurrents are likely to generate several waves that will deeply change the parties’ landscape and the political environment. The unlikely scenario will be one of continuity and stability. How strong and how deep change will be it remains to be seen. But a substantial amount of change should be expected. As one says: “shift happens”.