Lack of a Federal climate bill in the U.S. likely to jeopardize Cancun’s climate talks.

In an interview with ClimateWire, U.S. chief climate negotiator Todd Stern said the Obama administration is “not backing away” from its Copenhagen pledge to cut greenhouse gas emissions 17 percent below 2005 levels in the coming decade and more than 80 percent by mid-century. This is good news, but not enough to push Cancun’s climate talks beyond the Copenhagen Accord.

Stern has also tried to ease concerns that Obama’s failure to get Congress to vote an energy and climate legislation would impair negotiations at COP16, in Cancun.

“People who frame this all around whether there is U.S. legislation or not, that if there’s legislation we’re in the end zone … I don’t believe that. It’s not the magic bullet, and it’s also not the thing that sinks the ship.”

The above statement amounts to nothing more than good old diplomatic damage management. He knows that the without a legally binding domestic climate program the U.S. will hardly be able to play an effective role on global climate talks. Moreover, the lack of a clear political decision by the U.S. Congress on climate change and greenhouse gas emissions mitigation is likely to contribute to a deadlock in Cancun. A final global deal will probably be delayed for at least one year more.

Let’s talk plain politics: it is not possible for the U.S. to play a leading and decisive role on global climate politics without having in place a clear and legally binding domestic portfolio of actions on climate change. Every player needs a bill at home to back its pledges at the international level.

A recent BASIC meeting, in Rio de Janeiro, has showed that the major emerging economies are rethinking the nature and scope of their responsibilities regarding global climate change. They seem more prepared to move forward and turn most of the Copenhagen commitments into institutionalized global policies, provided the U.S. shows more concrete and effective commitments.

The Brazilian government remains the major exception today. It opposes any change of attitude from the BASIC countries. But India, South Africa and China are already more willing to admit the fact that they will have to assume more responsibilities in the near future. It is, however, unlikely that they’ll accept any change in the status quo, before the U.S. Presidency and Congress are able to give legal form to the country’s commitments in the Copenhagen Accord and signal they’re willing to go beyond that in the future.

Writing internationally assumed commitments into law will turn them into domestic obligations, and give them full credibility. An international protocol, like the Kyoto Protocol, without legal domestic backing means close to nothing.

Stern knows that. And because he knows it, after making the usual disclaim, he acknowledged that

“The fact that we don’t have it [the legislation] right now will certainly affect the atmospherics of the negotiations, but the fundamentals of it aren’t different. (…) The President has made it perfectly clear that he’s committed to energy and climate legislation, and we will press on.”

This means that the U.S. will arrive in Cancun with nothing more than Obama’s word that he’ll keep fighting for energy and climate legislation. Nothing very different from what has happened in Copenhagen, at COP15. As several negotiators have told Climate Wire they are compelled to trust President Obama’s word. But the fact remains that the U.S. will not have moved one single bit ahead after Copenhagen. On the contrary, in Copenhagen there was hope that the U.S. federal climate legislation would be forthcoming soon in 2010. Now it failed to pass, and the prospects for another try are unclear so far. The next move on climate legislation in the U.S. will very much depend on the results of midterm elections, and right now the outlook for the government’s majority is rather bleak.

The setback for climate legislation in the U.S. and Brazil’s refusal to support other BASIC country’s proposals for a change in the terms of negotiation will likely block any real progress in Cancun. If nothing changes until the end of November, COP16 is likely to be one more of an already long list of deadlocked meetings of the parties to the Climate Convention. That’s what diplomats and observers from Brazil, China and India are saying.

The U.S. is the key to unlock global climate talks. If Washington moves, than it is likely that the BASIC countries will move, and the probability of a legally binding accord increases significantly. The Brazilian government would have to follow suit independently of the outcome of the October presidential election. The Chinese government, already showing more propensity to change than the Brazilian, would not be able to resist the pressure. India and South Africa are already persuaded they’ll have to move forward.

To make it short and blunt: no U.S. climate bill, no global climate deal.

The BASIC meeting in Rio has had many new developments, but they were not mentioned in the official Joint Statement. Ministers from the BASIC countries shared a growing sentiment that it is unlikely that a second period of commitment to the Kyoto Protocol will ever be agreed by parties to the climate talks. This sense that the Kyoto Protocol is no longer a feasible route will likely change their negotiation strategy in future global climate meetings. India was rather clear about the need fort such a change, proposing that they should, from now on, work towards a single, inclusive global climate change agreement. This was one of the many turns in the discussions among ministers and negotiators that was not in the Joint Statement issued at the end of the meeting.

The BASIC ministers’ joint statement still stresses the importance of the

“two pronged approach, which envisages, on one hand, an ambitious and comprehensive outcome for the negotiations under both the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the UNFCCC and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments by Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol.”

Another important sentiment the ministers have shared in their private conversations was that the notion of “historical responsibilities” and “equitable burden sharing” could hardly lead to legally binding responsibilities for developed nations’ past emissions, especially regarding the pre-industrial and early industrial times. CO₂ was not even regarded as a polluting emission at the time. This sobering view has also been concealed by the almost meaningless diplomatic jargon of the communiqué.

“A global goal for emission reductions should be preceded by the definition of a paradigm for equitable burden sharing. They emphasized that equitable access to carbon space must be considered in the context of sustainable development, the right to which is at the heart of the climate change regime, and which demands the implementation of ambitious financing, technological support and capacity building.”

Quantified comparable pledges

What the ministers in Rio have really concluded even though tentatively was that developing nations with advanced economies will have to adequately quantify their share of the burden to curb emissions. To do that they agreed to take the initiative to develop a model to assess their pledges registered under the Copenhagen Accord. A group of high quality experts was present to the discussions and will continue to meet in order to work towards this common assessment. Although there was some opposition to the idea, especially from the Brazilian side, they decided that experts should attempt to make all BASIC pledges comparable, and equally measurable, reportable and verifiable. Ideally, they should try to find a common base to convert all pledges to a single measure.

This goal of comparable pledges on a single base was particularly defended by India and South Africa. China gave it a reluctant support at the end, probably conditional on deliberation by the Chinese top leadership. Brazil didn’t veto the initiative, although opposed to it. The general feeling, however, was that the Brazilian government will give no material support to the group of experts.

South African experts have presented what appears to be a very interesting preliminary model, considering multiple indicators. There was a general feeling that it could serve as a starting point for the development of  a methodology to assess the pledges and measure their real implications for the continued economic and social development of the countries. The South African minister of Water and Environmental Affairs, Buyelwa Sonjica, stressed her country’s great interest on this technical work.

Less words, more numbers

What became clear from the discussions is that the BASIC countries will have to abandon rhetorical demands and start to table sound technical proposals at climate talks. Instead of saying, as they still do, that their contribution to the global goal of emissions reductions cannot impose restrictions to their development goals, they will have to show the real effect of their pledges on their economies. The Joint Statement still refers to the “equitable access to carbon space in the context of sustainable development”, but they all know this has become an empty phrase. Very soon they will have to put actual numbers on the table to add value to this demand in future negotiations. This quantification of pledges, their requirements and impact will also be necessary to assess the financial needs of these larger developing economies to contribute to global emissions reductions efforts. Finance is an important issue for South Africa and India. China and Brazil would be able to finance most of their own climate change programs, especially on their initial stages.

That is what is in between the lines of the joint statement, when it says that the ministers

“underlined the need for further collaboration among BASIC experts on this issue, with a view to understanding the economic, social, scientific and technical implications of equitable access to carbon space and strengthening a common consideration of this matter.”

MRVs

China’s top climate negotiator, Xie Zhenhua, has caused some surprise when he proposed that the methodology for MRVs (measurable, reportable, and verifiable actions) should be discussed and developed by the group of experts. MRVs will be on the agenda of the next meeting to be held in Beijing in October. This is another area where there is a considerable distance between what the BASIC countries actually think and what they keep saying in public.

The Joint Statement says that the ministers

“noted the distinction between MRV of emission reduction commitments by developed countries, which is related to compliance and comparability, and MRV of nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) by developing countries, which is related to transparency. Ministers emphasized that work on the MRV of international support must advance urgently, including through the development of common procedures for the reporting of finance. They underscored that only supported NAMAs should be subject to international MRV, in conjunction with the MRV of international support, while non-supported NAMAs will apply a domestic MRV. International consultations and analysis of information regarding non-supported actions would be useful to enhance transparency, through a multilateral technical exchange under the UNFCCC.”

But in their conversations the ministers have shared the conviction that the Copenhagen pledges won’t escape being submitted to some MRV procedure still to be agreed upon. They know that to “non-supported NAMAs” that were registered as official pledges under the Copenhagen Accord will apply something more than “a domestic MRV”. They therefore concluded that the best thing to do is to be proactive and forward a methodology that could meet the terms of the Copenhagen Accord. That’s the true meaning of the phrase “international consultations and analysis of information regarding non-supported actions would be useful to enhance transparency, through a multilateral technical exchange under the UNFCCC”.

It was agreed that a starting point to develop this new form of MRV to meet the Copenhagen Accord requirements could be the procedure already adopted to review the national communications of emissions. National communications are reviewed by a group composed of representatives of the developed and developing countries, an UNFCCC technical official, and an independent expert.

It is interesting that the Joint Statement does not explicitly mention the Copenhagen Accord, although most of the technical issues they have agreed to pursue are associated to the pledges made under the Accord. The only mention to Copenhagen is indirect and related to finance.

There is no reference to Copenhagen when the Statement informs their position on MRVs, and the communiqué does not convey transparently what they have really concluded about  the need to develop an MRV methodology to meet the Accord’s transparency requirements. This was an issue arduously negotiated between President Obama and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in a historical meeting of the BASIC countries at the last hours of the Copenhagen Summit. Obama and Wen Jiabao discussed for a couple of hours the MRV issue and reached an agreement with the active intermediation of India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Brazilian President Lula da Silva. It is a good sign that the Chinese government is trying to honor what they have agreed. The relevant line of the Accord in this regard reads

“Non-Annex I Parties will communicate information on the implementation of their actions through National Communications, with provisions for international consultations and analysis under clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is respected.”

BASIC+

A side issue with some disruptive consequences for the geopolitics of climate change talks was whether they should move towards a BASIC+ arrangement. That is, whether other countries should be admitted as voting parties to the group. Indonesia, for instance, seems to aspire becoming a full member. The ministers have shown strong concern that such an idea could raise great difficulties with G-77 countries. South Africa’s minister, Buyelwa Sonjica, was particularly concerned that any expansion of the group could raise dissatisfaction among other parties. Since Copenhagen, the South African government has been under considerable pressure from African Union countries because of its participation in the BASIC. The living example was of the G-8 being superseded in many relevant issues by the G8+5 and, ultimately, by the G-20.

Although the BASIC countries are also a part of the G-77 all of them have it clear that their interests are becoming increasingly differentiated from the interests of the majority of other member states. They decided to maintain the BASIC original formation and to have observers and discussants at all their meetings, without decision-making power. This time, one of the invited observers was Venezuela. Yemen, now holding the G-77 chair, was also present and will be invited to all forthcoming meetings. The ministers have also agreed to always have observers from the small-island States, AOSIS, and from the African Union. Other developing countries would be invited when they could contribute to the debate of central issues in the agenda. In Beijing, for instance, one of these issues will be the impact of climate change negotiations on the international market. Argentina has been leading discussions on this issue within the G-77 and will be invited to Beijing.

Eppur si muove

There has been small, but significant, progress in the meeting of  the BASIC countries in Rio. Far more than the official Joint Statement has conveyed. Progress and consensus are stronger at the expert level. At the political level there still are important differences on the degree of conviction of each country regarding these new views. India and South Africa seemed far more convinced of the need for a change in attitude and negotiation strategy. China seems to be moving forward more cautiously. Brazil is far more reluctant to accept any change.

Jairam Ramesh, India’s Environment Minister, made a compelling defense of the benefits of giving more transparency to these shared views. He would like them to show in the communiqué. But Brazilian officials preferred a noncommittal phrasing of the joint statement.

Ramesh has also manifested his government’s willingness to lead the BASIC group into an effort to bridge the gap between them and the United States. He has also called the BASIC countries to reach out to develop countries like France and Germany that hold similar views to their own about global climate change.

It is unlikely that these changing views will be mature enough and find sufficient common ground among the BASIC countries to lead to a different attitude at COP16, in Cancun. But some of the sentiments they’ve revealed are likely to emerge more publicly in Mexico. It is likely, for instance, that they will have more technical proposals to table. It is also likely, but less probable, that their insistence upon a second phase of commitment of the Kyoto Protocol will recede to some visible degree, helping faster progress on the AGW-LCA towards a more inclusive global agreement some time in the near future. The signs of a paradigm shift on the BASIC countries’ climate change politics are becoming clearer.

The MEF gathers seventeen major economic powers, not by chance also major carbon emitters. The “chair’s summary” of the “Seventh Leaders’ Representative Meeting” meeting mentions the Copenhagen Accord several times as a guideline for further progress. It says that “participants emphasized the importance of quickly implementing the Copenhagen Accord’s Fast Start financing provisions.” The communiqué also stressed the need for transparency and maximum clarity to build international confidence as a requisite for a balanced outcome in Cancun. Many participants argued the need to focus adaptation efforts on less developed countries particularly vulnerable to climate change. The note also informs that member countries “provided updates on their actions to meet their fast start financing commitments under the Accord.”

The MEF has also discussed the divisive issue of “monitoring, reporting and verifying” (MRV) emission targets, i.e. the transparency of emission reductions commitments. According to the chair’s summary “it was suggested that, per the Copenhagen Accord, there are essentially three areas of MRV to be addressed”, namely mitigation efforts of countries that are in Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol; financial and technological support of mitigation efforts of “non-Annex I” countries; and mitigation efforts of “non-Annex I” countries.

“Participants noted the various mitigation targets and actions listed under the Copenhagen Accord. They further discussed how such targets and actions might be reflected in a future outcome, including with respect to whether or not they should have a legally binding character, whether there should be a single instrument or two instruments, the timing of reflecting mitigation targets/actions, the application of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and other aspects.”

The paragraph above shows that the Copenhagen Accord although a political signpost has left several crucial questions open to doubt or contradiction. The two-instrument issue, was clearly not adequately solved by the Accord. The doubt remaining is whether there should be an additional legally binding agreement for “non-Annex I” countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and for countries that have not ratified it, like the US, and have registered emission reduction targets under the Copenhagen Accord, or a single new treaty binding to all and superseding the Kyoto Protocol.

This contradiction between the political support to the Copenhagen Accord by the leaders of the world’s major nations, and the resistance of the parties to UNFCCC to admit it into the official proceedings of the Climate Talks is a central issue the new climate secretary Christiana Figueres will have to deal with. If the Accord does not become an integral part of the Convention, it will always serve as a an escape route for countries that are associated to it and have registered their commitments in its annexes to avoid further binding commitments under the UNFCCC. It will also be used by recalcitrant parties to veto any progress supported by the majority of the parties at COP-16.

The Copenhagen Accord is clearly not a finished job. But is has a critical advantage over the UNFCCC. The Accord has the formal commitment of the major carbon emitters, with quantified targets for emission reductions. It represents the first portfolio of national actions ever to commit large emitters as the United States, China, India, and Brazil, among others. It covers over 80% of total emissions, far more than the Kyoto Protocol. It is clearly not sufficient to reduce carbon emissions to the safety level. But it is a major political resource that should not be neglected.

Although not legally binding, it has been adopted by the major developed and emerging powers as a politically biding reference. The UNFCCC’s Executive Secretary’s challenge is to find a way to positively use this political commitment to remove vetoes and to ensure that deals closed in Copenhagen are not reopened in Cancun. The Copenhagen Accord is a political tool that should be used to help nations move towards a new future climate treaty.

‘Coalition of the Willing’ is a collaborative animated film and web-based event about an online war against global warming in a post Copenhagen world.

Directed and produced by Knife Party, written by Tim Rayner and crafted by a network of 24 artists from around the world.

The film explores, in an optimistic vein, how one can use new Internet technologies to leverage the powers of activists, experts, and citizens in collaborative ventures to combat climate change.

It makes the case for online activism analyzing swarm activity and social revolution.

See it here:

Coalition Of The Willing from coalitionfilm on Vimeo.

We should not expect too much from the first climate talks after Copenhagen, now taking place in Bonn. There are still some political obstacles to tackle before we can get any real further progress.Copenhagen was marked by excessive expectations and curtailed by the plot of a small group of nations to impose an agreement they had previously negotiated behind the curtains. The inflation of expectations has led to an almost general disregard for what has been effectively gained in Copenhagen. It has also made invisible to many some of the virtues of the Copenhagen Accord. The whole story of the “Danish document” has generated a crisis of confidence since the beginning of the talks. The lack of trust among the parties has irremediably contaminated the climate for climate change negotiations.

Copenhagen was rescued from oblivion by the massive amount of nations associating themselves to its terms and filing their mitigation actions. The Accord seemed to have been abandoned as a failed attempt, since the COP15 plenary only took note of it. But it could no longer be ignored after 125 nations have associated to it and 75 have registered their national mitigation actions/targets. The Accord has become the most important official portfolio of national mitigation actions, covering around 80% of global carbon emissions.

Altogether the mitigation actions in this portfolio fall short of what is recommended by the best science available. They are, however, a political breakthrough, a turning point after more than a decade of deadlock. All the relevant countries that have systematically refused to internationally commit themselves to mitigation targets have registered their actions under the Copenhagen Accord. Particularly relevant was the decision by the USA, China, India and Brazil to register their national actions. They were the decisive players at the final moments leading to the Accord. In other words, the stronger veto players that have contributed to a long sequence of deadlocked talks have become the key leadership to close the deal. And let’s not forget, they are full members at the top of the global high-carbon club.

There were also a few setbacks after Copenhagen. First, until now President Obama has failed to obtain a climate change law from Congress. This means that  actions the U.S. has filed under the Copenhagen Accord lack a legal domestic foundation. Secondly, the Brazilian government is delaying the adoption of enabling legislation that would allow the Federal climate change law to be properly enforced. Brazilian actions registered under the Copenhagen Accord also lack the necessary legal domestic foundation to be actually implemented. The government is additionally delaying the country’s emissions report. Without an updated inventory of emissions it is almost impossible to design effective sectoral and corporate policies to reduce emissions. Thirdly, China an India keep making contradictory political statements regarding global climate negotiations. At times it seems they are proposing to throw the Copenhagen Accord into history’s wastebasket. At other times it seems they are willing to move ahead considering what has been decided in Copenhagen as a done deal. The bright side is that both countries have adopted several important policy steps that will enable them to meet the targets they’ve registered under the Accord, if not to go beyond them. Among the BASIC nations, Brazil is clearly the laggard.

There has also been some progress on specific issues after Copenhagen. A case in point is REDD. After the Oslo talks we may be just a few steps from closing a deal on its initial architecture. To have the deal done should be one of the priorities in Cancún. But make no mistake, under the Climate Convention, nothing is closed until everything is closed.

For this year’s climate talks to succeed two major steps should be taken. On the one side, developed countries should take action to start the fast-track finance flow they’ve approved in Copenhagen. This is a sine qua non to restore confidence among the partners of the Copenhagen Accord, as well as among the Parties to the Climate Convention. It goes far beyond the money issue. It is about doing what has been agreed upon without further ado.  A good opportunity to do that would be the G20 Summit in Toronto, at the end of this month.

On the other side, organized civil society and political environmental organizations should concentrate efforts to ensure progress on domestic grounds. The priority should be to try to speed up climate change legislation in the U.S. and Brazil. European civil society should make every effort to see that their respective countries give support to Connie Hedegaard’s proposal for an unilateral upgrading of the European Union emissions reduction target. Such a move would also very much help confidence building among the relevant parties to the climate talks.

These initiatives would make a relevant and sufficient agenda for 2010. The “post-Cancún” challenge would be to create the necessary and sufficient political and diplomatic conditions for a binding global climate change agreement, embracing the Copenhagen Accord and expanding upon it. This task depends on these incremental advancements in 2010.

To embrace the Copenhagen Accord would mean to incorporate into the LCA working group proposal its architecture of annexes containing the portfolio of national actions. The path inaugurated by the Copenhagen Accord, “from domestic grounds to the multilateral forum” is far more conducive to a global agreement than the traditional UN path “from the multilateral forum to domestic grounds”. In other words, the “bottom up” strategy of the Copenhagen Accord is better than the “unanimous assembly of nations” approach of the Climate Convention. The idea that the decision by unanimity in the plenary of the Convention is the most democratic way is plainly wrong. It is simply the best way to empower intransigent minor veto players to block any meaningful progress desired by a large majority.

The endeavor to progressively adjust the portfolio of national actions to the necessary scientific requirements will more likely be accomplished between 2012-2015. This is probably the most friendly way to go in the political field. The pending political requirement is the effective implementation of the Copenhagen decisions. What the governing leaders have agreed last December must hold, otherwise no deal will be trusted. Political decisions need some maturing time before they can be adjusted to scientific needs. To try to subordinate politics to science is a shortcut to failure. The greatest progress we’ve seen in Copenhagen was the transformation of deniers imposing cross-cutting vetoes, into negotiators proposing ways to get out of the deadlock. Important mature and emerging powers, such as the United States, China, India and Brazil, have moved from denial to agreement even if yet a reluctant, conditional agreement. It really doesn’t matter. The real progress was to stop saying only “nay” and to start saying a few decisive “yea”. This was the essential gain in Copenhagen. Now, this “yea” has to be translated into domestic legislation and policy. Laws have yet to be enforced, policies have to yield effective, measurable actions. Decisions made in Copenhagen should be implemented immediately. This is the case of the fast-track short-term finance agreed upon last December.

Only after going through these preliminary steps can we start thinking about improvements upon what was accomplished in Copenhagen, taking further action and committing to higher targets.

After a fast-track approval of the climate change bill, its enabling legislation is deadlocked at the Civil Household. The bill was rushed through Congress for president Lula to arrive in Copenhagen with the law already signed. But without the enabling legislation it is useless, and emission reduction targets cannot be enforced.

The Civil Household filters and process all government proposals before they are taken to the President. While Chief of Civil Household, Presidential candidate Dilma Roussef commanded all aspects of government policy but foreign affairs with a very strong hand and an outstretched arm. She has never been very enthusiastic about climate change policies.

Sources who have been involved in the decision-making process told me that conflict among government representatives responding to different sectoral interests have become almost intractable. A majority among them resists mandating any carbon curbing action other than reducing deforestation. There is strong resistance to any emission reduction targeting for the industrial, energy, and transportation sectors.

There are several sources of veto to sectoral actions on climate change. The officials in charge of climate policy at the Ministry of Science and Technology are against any carbon reduction policy other than curbing deforestation. They claim Brazil already has a low carbon economy. Scientists who work at the National Institute for Space Research (INPE), under the Ministry of Science and Technology umbrella, strongly disagree. They are among the most active advocates for fast and encompassing climate change regulation. The Development, Transportation, Energy, and Agriculture ministries also oppose adopting targeted sectoral actions. To them any delay on regulation would be welcome, especially in the pre-electoral and campaign seasons. It is obvious to anyone with a minimum knowledge of the Brazilian economy that it belongs to the high carbon family. It will move faster towards higher levels of carbon intensity, if nothing is done.

Since Dilma Roussef’s times the Civil Household has resisted climate change-oriented policies. The two first Environment ministers, Marina Silva and Carlos Minc, have always had to fight for their policies, often clashing with other ministers, and frequently failing to get them approved by the President.

In one of the fiercest confrontations around policies for the Amazon region, Marina Silva, now an opposition presidential bidder, has resigned. She was replaced by Carlos Minc who, through confrontation and concession, was able to get Lula’s approval to the policy now filed under the Copenhagen Accord.  Minc left the Ministry to run for the state of Rio de Janeiro’s House of Representatives.

The incumbent minister, Izabella Teixeira, does not have the leadership nor the experience required to break this deadlock. The present Chief of Civil Household also lacks expertise and leadership. Without President Lula’s direct intervention it is unlikely regulation would be adopted anytime before this year’s elections.

This places Brazil far behind its two major partners in the BASIC group, China and India. After the BASIC and President Obama brokered the Copenhagen Accord, both China and India have been very active in adopting new policies that would enable them to meet the targets they’ve registered on the Accord’s Annex.

Extreme natural events may be a source of huge human and economic losses, although they are not, in themselves ‘disasters’. A disaster happens when an extreme natural event reaches a populated area.

Often the extent of human losses depends on the vulnerability of the population affected as well as on the degree of preparedness, and the quality of resources for disaster prevention. A poor country will suffer more. The poor wherever they are also will suffer more. Economic losses are greater where there is more property to be damaged, especially valuable economic assets such as industrial plants, commercial buildings, crops or large residential areas.

Munich Re’s NatCatService collects data on fatalities and economic losses caused by ‘natural disasters’ – a misnomer. It shows that, from 2004 to 2009, 543 thousand people have died from natural geophysical, and climatic/hydrological events. Economic losses amounted to US$ 753 billion, and insured losses to US$ 256 billion. Geophysical events are earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. Climatic and hydrological events are storms, floods, landslides, extreme temperatures, droughts, and wildfires.

Losses were caused by a total of 4,725 extreme events. Geophysical events represented, on average, 11% of the total over the last six years. But, they were, on average, the cause of  47% of human losses. There were three major deviations from this average. In 2004, that category of extreme events provoked 95% of total fatalities, because of the earthquake and tsunami in South Asia and East Africa, killing 220 thousand people. In 2004, it represented 90% of fatalities. An earthquake in Pakistan, India and Afghanistan killed 88 thousand people. In 2007, however, geophysical events accounted for only 5% of the fatalities. The deadliest events were cyclone Sidr, killing over 3,775 people in Bangladesh, and floods in China, killing almost 6,800 people.

Climatic and environmental events accounted for 89% of total extreme events registered. Storms were 41% of the total; floods and landslides averaged 31%; waves of extreme temperatures and wildfires, 17%. They were also the main source of economic losses, accounting, on average, in the period, for 81% of such losses. Storms were, by far, the costliest events, explaining around 58% of economic losses. (Click for larger image)

Both human and economic losses vary greatly year by year, depending on the incidence of extreme events in more populated areas. As the chart shows, the greatest fatalities have occurred in 2004, due to the earthquake, particularly the tsunami in South Asia and East Africa. The second deadliest year was 2008 because of the fatalities caused by the earthquake in China, killing more than 70 thousand people, and cyclone Nargis, in Myanmar, killing almost 85 thousand people. (Click for larger image)

Climate-related risks and greening the supply-chain are common features of most presentations about sustainability and corporate social responsibility. Sometimes they are presented as “trends” or future threats. But they are not something that will happen in the future. They are already part of the daily affairs of most companies. And they are inseparable from each other.

Climate-related risks are a matter of present concern to every major insurance company (here, here and here) and to an increasing number of institutional investors. Green procurement is a key competitive factor today (here). Not a trend for tomorrow. Companies are looking deep into their supply chains not because of their view of the future, but because of present dangers to their business. They know they have to reduce their carbon footprint. WallMart Nike and Timberland banned beef and leather produced in the Amazon because of present consumers reaction to evidence that their procurement behavior was contributing to deforestation. Every company will have to account for GHG emissions caused by their demand for products and services as well as for the impact of what they sell on consumers’ carbon footprint. The time of the company that is clean and green indoors, but pays no attention to what it buys and to what happens to the goods it sells is over.

Going green is not easy. This is now a stock phrase. But, no matter whether easy or hard, going green has become a necessary and urgent step to every industry. To some industries, how to go green has a straightforward answer. It may be hard, but the knowledge base already exists. It will require leadership from the top; getting the right response from the corporate citizenry; better integration between procurement and finance; finding qualified people to lead changes; develop capabilities along the supply-chain.

Some industries still find greening their services a difficult and elusive task (here). On a recent roundtable at Cornell’s prestigious School of Hotel Administration, participants found that green standards for the industry are unclear and consumer’s views inconsistent. Hotels are reluctant to implement sustainable systems although they recognize the need to green their operations. It is a bit surprising to read that. From the standpoint of hotels’ supply-chains there are plenty of visible points where greening is possible and straightforward.

To anyone having a long view on what is happening now and of probable future trends, climate change-related risks are no longer a matter of doubt or probabilities. Probabilities are so high, that one can’t simply design a plausible “no climate change scenario”.  The long view tells us that the economy is already reshaping itself responding both to structural crises and risk-driven change. Greening the supply-chain is part of the present drivers of competition and innovative behavior. It is no longer a feature of future scenarios. Future scenarios are about things that go beyond a green supply-chain.

The ongoing process of corporate greening is at its beginning, but it is already visible. It is very likely one of the paramount factors that may lead to a new long-cycle of investment and economic growth, within less than a decade. Just think for a moment about the enormous dynamic push of leading companies at the top of the productive and commercial sectors greening their supply-chain. This movement forces all suppliers of major companies to also green their own supply-chains, if they want to stay in the economy’s major clusters. And their suppliers will have to follow suit for the same reason, and so on. The demand for green or low-carbon supplies where there are none, becomes an irresistible incentive to innovative startups. This movement goes from the global economic clusters, to the national ones, and to the sub-national ones.

There are already systemic movements visible in the global economy. They point to emerging processes and behaviors that will effectively reshape the corporate environment. Present production and consumption patterns that still appear to be dominant will inexorably be replaced. We are already riding the giant waves of a scientific, technological and behavioral revolution in every field of human activity. Overlooking these movements is accepting a present danger, not disregarding a possible future threat.

Sergio Abranches

The Copenhagen Accord has become the most representative global climate political agreement since the Framework Convention on Climate Change, that entered into force on 21, March, 1994. It now has the formal adhesion of more than 100 countries, including all large carbon emitters of the world, except Russia, amounting to more than 80% of global GHG emissions. But it has no legal force. It depends entirely on the signatories’ willingness to hold to their promised emissions reductions.

The convention is, as its name says, a legal framework, not an operational treaty. The legal operational instrument is the Kyoto Protocol, signed on December, 11, 1997, but coming into force only on 16, February, 2005. The U.S. has never ratified it. The large emerging economies, China, India, and Brazil, have no obligations under the protocol. Only “Annex I Countries” have binding emissions reduction targets. Targets for the period of 2008-2012 were set too low: ~ 5% of 1990 global emissions. Although legally binding, the Protocol has no mechanism of enforcement. The legal consequence of Annex I countries’ noncompliance is unclear.

The Kyoto Protocol has broad support among environmentalists and G77 governments because it is legally binding. Legally binding, it is. Politically representative, it is not. Its targets are too small to make a difference, and there has been no agreement so far on its second commitment period.

The Copenhagen Accord is operational, although not legally binding. Its targets represent around 20% of 1990 global emissions to 2020. They are at least five percentage points below what would be necessary to barely meet the 2^oC limit. The U.S. pledge is far too low, representing a reduction of no more than 5% of its 1990 emissions to 2020.

The history of the major BASIC countries’ (China, India, and Brazil) formal support to the Accord is yet to be told. They’ve initially registered their voluntary targets, without formally and explicitly supporting the accord. The first Brazilian letter, confirming the country’s mitigation actions, was rather ambiguous about the country’s association to the Accord. Afterwards the government has sent a second letter stating its formal support more clearly. It took more time for India and China to follow suit. This delay has to do with Post-Copenhagen political discussions about the Copenhagen Accord between the BASIC countries and their unsupportive G77 partners. At the end of the day, the fact that the BASIC countries were among the Accord’s major brokers has prevailed.

India’s Environment minister, Jairam Ramesh, explained to the Parliament that the decision to officially support the Accord was taken “after careful consideration”. Reuters reports that he told MPs that: “we believe that our decision (…) reflects the role India played in giving shape to the Copenhagen Accord.”

The U.S. sees the Copenhagen Accord as the only way towards a future full climate treaty. Todd Stern, chief U.S. climate envoy has said on several occasions that his country will not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. He also said the Obama Administration would like the Copenhagen Accord to guide talks on a new treaty. The United States has urged further formalization of the Accord at the next major U.N. climate meeting in Cancún, Mexico, Reuters reports.

G77 countries, including the BASIC, consider the continuation of the Kyoto Protocol as a sine qua non to any further deals.

Climate diplomacy has, now, two ways to go. One would be to work towards a new Protocol to substitute Kyoto, having the Copenhagen Accord as a starting point. To achieve that, the G77 would have to be persuaded to abandon the Kyoto Protocol. The other way would be to adopt the “two-track” solution. This track requires the agreement on  a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol, and the legal formalization of the Copenhagen Accord in Cancun, at COP16 or, more likely, at COP17, in South Africa, in 2011.

While the U.S. and the European Union embraced the Copenhagen Accord with no reserves, the BASIC countries said the Accord is not legal. The only legal instrument they accept is the Kyoto Protocol. Does it really matter if they adhere and record their quantitative voluntary actions? Is this an important divide between developed and emerging powers?

I feel increasingly inclined to answer no to both questions.

Let’s be practical. The Kyoto Protocol is legal, but its targets were set so low that they became utterly ineffective. The U.S. didn’t ratify the Protocol. The BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) are “non-Annex I” parties, meaning they have no binding obligations.

As a result, the Protocol has a very partial coverage of total GHG emissions. Being legally binding made almost no difference to the trajectory of emissions or to the behavior of the Parties to the Protocol. To the BASIC countries, the legal character of the Kyoto Protocol serves only to make it sure they have no legal obligations, because they do not belong to the Annex I. The U.S. will never ratify it. There has been little progress in the negotiations regarding its Phase 2. The Post 2012 Kyoto Protocol will not have China, Brazil and India among Annex I countries, and without the U.S. as well, it will remain a poor instrument to tackle the global climate change threat.

Now, let’s look at the Copenhagen Accord. With the adhesion of the U.S., the European Union, Canada, Australia, China, India, Brazil, and South Africa it covers most of the global GHG emissions. Add Japan and Russia, and it reaches the level of emissions that, if appropriately regulated, can do the job of preventing a climactic cataclysm. This select group of countries represent most of global political, economic, and scientific power as well.

The Accord is not legal indeed. It is political. With all these countries saying they’re politically committed to its terms, and publicly recording their voluntary actions to reduce emissions, it, nevertheless, gets substance and relevance. All of them are recording quantitative goals. To call them binding targets or voluntary actions seems so far a matter of lesser importance. Just look at what happened to Kyoto’s binding targets. To me it is more important that, for the first time, the U.S., China, Brazil, and India are making political commitments for emissions reductions. And they come with a number attached.

These targets still fall short of responding to scientific requirements. But the Accord also provides for performance reviews to conform actions to the requirement of maintaing global warming near 2^oC. This is already more than the Kyoto Protocol has accomplished. It has also resolved some decade long deadlocks on finance and technology transfer.

What the Copenhagen Accord lacks, the Kyoto Protocol also doesn’t have: a working enforcement mechanism. We are far from having an adequate framework for global climate governance. And we will have to eventually arrive at one.

The Copenhagen Accord can move forward along two different tracks. The first one, would be to enter the diplomatic track of the Climate Convention. Its terms and targets/actions would have to be transcribed into an official document tabled by the Working Group on the Climate Convention (AWG-LCA) to be unanimously approved by the plenary of 192 countries, hopefully during COP16, in Cancun, Mexico.

The alternative route would be to keep going on its own. The countries that have adhered to the Accord would continue to negotiate an appropriate and acceptable legal statute. Negotiations should also address the governance regime that would make this statute enforceable and policy-relevant.

The first road seems to be the harder one. The history of the Climate Convention has showed how difficult it is to reach consensus within such a large and heterogeneous group of countries.

The Copenhagen Accord has gained some new substance with the adhesion of the “carbon powers” of the world. A smaller group of countries, even if a polarized one, is more likely to reach a meaningful agreement than a large group of more than 100 nations with disparate interests.

The convention plenary is so divided that it is even hard to form polarized coalitions within it. What we’ve seen in Copenhagen was the fractionalization of previous clusters of countries, as the likelihood of an agreement increased. That’s how the G77 and China broke down, the BASIC, the AOSIS, and the African block replacing it. These three blocks have proved to be far more politically productive than the G77.

That the Accord is still alive, in spite of the frustrations it has raised at the dismal closing of COP15, seems a good omen. A global climate change deal is still possible.