Sergio Abranches

Why the Durban Platform is a political breakthrough, but a dismal outcome in the light of climate science?

The second part of the question is far easier to answer. Negotiators in Durban have agreed to review the pledges for emissions reductions in the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol and Cancun Agreement by 2015 in the light of the fifth assessment report on the state of science, to be released by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change from September 2013. However, as the IPCC said on a press statement about COP17, “in its fourth assessment report published in 2007, the IPCC showed that a temperature increase of 2 degrees Celsius could have a damaging effect on water supplies, biodiversity, food supplies, coastal flooding and storms and health.”

Additionally, the IPCC also states that:

“The fourth assessment report shows that emissions of the greenhouse gases that contribute to global warming must fall by 2050 by 50-85% globally compared to the emissions of the year 2000, and that global emissions must peak well before the year 2020, with a substantial decline after that, in order to limit the growth in global average temperatures to 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.”

From the standpoint of science Durban has decided on too little too late.

In the political realm, though, COP17 was a watershed. First of all, it closes a whole chapter of negotiations on commitment periods under the Kyoto Protocol. There will be only a second one, with fewer ratifiers than the first. COP18 will still have to decide whether it will end by 2017 or 2020. There has been no consensus on the end date, and the alternatives ended up within brackets. But the main point has been resolved: it will be replaced by a new “protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties”, no later than 2020. That’s the core decision contained in the Durban Platform.

The above expression is a political breakthrough, one that has been progressively taking shape since COP15, in Copenhagen. There, for the first time ever, the United States and the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) have agreed to offer quantified pledges for emission reductions under the United Nations Climate Convention (UNFCCC). They were voluntary, not legally binding, but they have been formally registered with UNFCCC”s Executive Secretariat. It was a major first step and, at the same time, a frustrating decision.

Much more was expected from the leaders of both developed, and emerging world powers. Besides, the leaders left abruptly, creating an authority gap, between the political summit and the official Conference of the Parties. A weak COP presidency and the resulting authority gap led the plenary to only “take note” of what the leaders had agreed. The Copenhagen Accord was noted as a political decision, but did not become an “official” agreement under the track of the Convention.

The second step towards the breakthrough was made in Cancun. The pledges under the Copenhagen Accord were adopted by the Cancun Agreement, that has also made official several other decisions made in Copenhagen, as well as some that were left to be finalized by COP16, in Mexico. In Cancun, the voluntary commitments became official ones, under the umbrella of the Climate Convention.

In Durban, negotiators from the United States, the BASIC group, and the European Union underlined the official nature of the Cancun Agreement, as a preparation of the groundwork for the Platform to launch the process leading to the new universal agreement with legal force applicable to all parties to the Climate Convention. In a nutshell, it was acknowledged by all relevant parties that these commitments are legal, although not binding. The difference: the Kyoto Protocol, besides being a legal instrument, explicitly states that the targets for the countries (“industrialized countries”) listed on its Annex I are mandatory. The Cancun Agreement is part and parcel of the Climate Convention, therefore it has legal status, but the commitments registered by the parties are voluntary, not mandatory.

Finally, the Durban Platform takes the decisive step: it commits all major emitters outside the Kyoto Protocol to the negotiation of a new agreement with legal force, under which all commitments will have the same legal treatment, although they could be quantitatively differentiated on the basis of each party’s capacities.

This is not an easy decision to make. Even before it is formally adopted it is likely to cause the countries to start planning domestic actions to enable them to meet the targets yet to be defined. It is unrealistic to imagine, as some environmentalists do, that a “top down approach”, by which a decision under the Climate Convention would bind countries to take actions, would ever work.

Even the Kyoto Protocol praised for its “legally binding” status has no enforcement mechanism. What enforcement mechanism could lead Canada to meet its targets for the first period of commitment next year? None at all. Even with UN officials stating that although outside the Protocol it still has the obligation, Canada will likely fail to meet its Kyoto target, and there will hardly be any consequence to its noncompliance.

Politics hardly moves ahead of the facts. It is not a proactive process. It is a responsive one. Politics responds to active interests in economy and society. It seldom reflects even the “inactive majority” or the majority of “public opinion”. Political decisions respond to “active interest groups”, to economic constraints and inducements, and to the domestic correlation of power. Countries that show greater ambition of emissions reductions also have greater active political support from domestic economic and social forces to policies aiming at coping with climate change. Their domestic policies are usually more ambitious than their multilateral commitments.

If one looks at China’s domestic policies to reduce emissions and other forms of pollution, one will easily see that they are far ahead of what Chinese lead negotiators are willing to commit to at the Climate Convention.

Politics, in this sense, consolidates what countries are ripe to commit to at the multilateral level. The approach that really counts, and leads to progress in the negotiations under the Climate Convention is the bottom up one.

What is meaningful and relevant about the Durban process is that over the last three years major developed and emerging countries have become readier to admit to the possibility of a single climate change regime encompassing them all. The US, China, India, and Brazil said that much several times during COP17, and signed into it at the end. This outcome was not guaranteed at the outset of the climate talks. It was the result of intense negotiation and consultation. Negotiators have likely had to obtain a specific mandate from their leaders, in mid-game, to go as far as they’ve gone.

What will happen next will depend on what happens inside each of these countries. The focus of pressure should be domestic politics, rather than diplomatic undertakings. Not that the COP process doesn’t matter. It does, very much. But its main function is not to shape climate change policies to be adopted domestically. It is to consolidate progress on domestic climate change policies at the multilateral level, adding cross-country constraints and global transparency to the agreed actions. This enables, for instance, a network of domestic and global civil society organizations to join forces to act as watchdogs, to ensure that policies are in line with targets. It does make a difference to have a global accounting system for greenhouse gas emissions, and to have a global registry for quantitative targets for emission reductions. These outcomes would strengthen the multilateral regulatory system, and would also give more punch to domestic pressure from civil society and opposition parties in overseeing their government’s implementation of climate change policies.

The year 2015 has become a new milestone for global climate change politics. Two crucial decisions shall be taken at COP21, if the Durban Platform is to be completed. Firstly, the review of the emission reduction commitments to seek coherence with the 2 degrees Celsius target. As pointed before, it is absolutely sure that the new IPCC report will show a serious gap between committed actions and warming trends. If parties are to take their commitments seriously, they’ll have to revise their targets upwards for the period 2015-2020. Secondly, they’ll have to decide on the new “protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties” to be adopted no later than 2020.

The political engine is set to move. The pace and destination it will take will depend on the evolution of domestic economic and social forces over the next three years. Another important factor will be the domestic interplay of interests, and the power of pressure and advocacy groups. Bilateral and multilateral politics do have a role, but never a dominant one. Competition and coalition among nations and groups of nations, also help in shaping decisions. They’ll help to pave the way to future outcomes. But they do so by responding to domestic interests and projecting them on the global arena.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which provides policy-makers with the current state of climate science, has issued today a statement on the Durban outcome. It shows concern about the decision to “adopt a universal legal agreement on climate change as soon as possible, but not later than 2015, to be adopted and come into force from 2020.” The Durban agreement reinstates the decision to review the Copenhagen/Cancun pledges to reduce emissions in the light of the IPCC next report, to be released in 2013. The IPCC has been asked what impact these agreements will have on global warming.

The statement says that the IPCC is due to publish the first part of its next assessment report, the fifth, in 2013. But in its fourth assessment report, published in 2007, it already showed that an increase of 2 degrees Celsius could have damaging effects. It also says that greenhouse gases must fall by 2050 by 50-85% globally compared to the emissions of the year 2000, and that global emissions must peak well before the year 2020.

The IPCC says that “the series of agreements reached on Sunday by nearly 200 countries in Durban lays a foundation for the global community to tackle climate change.” But it warns “that action must be taken swiftly to cut emissions to prevent a damaging rise in world temperatures.”

See the full text of the statement.

Statement by the IPCC

13 December 2011

Action must be taken swiftly to cut emissions to prevent a damaging rise in world temperatures, Climate Panel findings show

The series of agreements reached on Sunday by nearly 200 countries in Durban lays a foundation for the global community to tackle climate change.

Governments meeting at the annual climate conference of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) decided to adopt a universal legal agreement on climate change as soon as possible, but not later than 2015, to be adopted and come into force from 2020. At the same time they recognized the need to raise their collective level of ambition to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to keep the average global temperature rise below 2 degrees Celsius.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has been asked what impact these agreements will have on global warming.

The IPCC, which provides policy-makers with the current state of climate science, including the impact of climate change and what can be done to tackle it, is due to publish the first part of its next assessment report, the fifth, in 2013.

But already in its fourth assessment report published in 2007, the IPCC showed that a temperature increase of 2 degrees Celsius could have a damaging effect on water supplies, biodiversity, food supplies, coastal flooding and storms and health.

The fourth assessment report shows that emissions of the greenhouse gases that contribute to global warming must fall by 2050 by 50-85% globally compared to the emissions of the year 2000, and that global emissions must peak well before the year 2020, with a substantial decline after that, in order to limit the growth in global average temperatures to 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. In the near term, by 2020, emissions from industrialized countries (listed in Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol) need to be reduced by 25-40% below 1990 levels, while substantial deviations from the current trend in developing countries and emerging economies will also be required

This must be borne in mind in the package. The earlier action is taken, the cheaper and more effective it will be.

Sergio Abranches, from Durban

The documents still circulating at COP17 show notable political progress, but fall short of adequately meeting the risks already pointed out by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change — IPCC — fourth assessment of climate science. They are still under discussion, and final decision may still be significantly different. It is likely, however, they will keep the general thrust of the documents.

Politics is rarely moved by the science on the issues requiring policy decisions. Politics is moved by interests, interactions, power competition, alliances, and conflicts. All that play a strong role to shape the global politics of climate change. At the political level there are unprecedented moves reflected on documents not yet approved by COP17 plenary.

Perhaps the most important one is the support from the United States, China, India and Brazil of a a “process to develop a Protocol or another legal instrument applicable to all Parties under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change”. This process, says the draft document, shall “begin immediately and be conducted as a matter of urgency”, so that the new working group the plenary should create can “complete its work as early as possible but no later than 2015, in order to adopt this legal instrument” at COP21. It “shall raise levels of ambition and be informed, inter alia, by the fifth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the outcomes of the 2013-2015 review”.

In short this means that by 2020 there should be a common legal regime on climate change encompassing all parties to the climate convention, that this legal instrument could even be a new protocol, thus legally-binding, it would have quantified mitigation targets for all major emitters. The new instrument should be ready to be adopted by 2015, at COP21. The quantitative targets should in line with the new IPCC assessment report, that should be used to guide the review of the commitments made in Copenhagen and reaffirmed on the Cancun Agreement.

The other breakthrough is the formal admission that there is a “significant gap between the aggregated effect of Parties’ mitigation pledges in terms of global annual emissions of greenhouse gases by 2020 and aggregate emissions pathways consistent with having a likely chance of holding warming below 2°C or 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.”

In other words the document formally notes, and with grave concern, that there is a gap between the commitments to reduce GHG emissions and the commitment to keep the chances of warming below 2°C or 1.5°C. The 2°C is the target approved under the Copenhagen Accord, and the Cancun Agreement. The 1.5°C is a demand from the small islands states, the African Group, and the Less Developed Countries, admitted by the Cancun Agreement.

These hard to make political steps forward are a sine qua non for a more ambitious, science-based, rule-based future global climate change policy.

Global carbon emissions from burning fossil fuels have increased by 49 per cent in the last two decades, shows study published in the journal Nature Climate Change. 

The article ‘Rapid growth in CO₂ emissions after the 2008-2009 global financial crisis’ was published online by Nature Climate Change yesterday. The study is a part of the Global Carbon Project, and shows that fossil fuel emissions increased by 5.9 per cent in 2010 and by 49 per cent since 1990 – the reference year for the Kyoto protocol. On average, fossil fuel emissions have risen by 3.1 per cent each year between 2000 and 2010 – three times the rate of increase during the 1990s. They are projected to continue to increase by 3.1 per cent in 2011.

Total emissions – which combine fossil fuel combustion, cement production, deforestation and other land use emissions – reached 10 billion tons of carbon in 2010 for the first time. Half of the emissions remained in the atmosphere, where CO₂ concentration reached 389.6 parts per million. The remaining emissions were taken up by the ocean and land reservoirs, in approximately equal proportions.

Last year’s high growth was caused by both emerging and developed economies. Rich countries continued to outsource part of their emissions to emerging economies through international trade. Contributions to global emissions growth in 2010 were largest from China, the United States, India, the Russian Federation and the European Union. Emissions from the trade of goods and services produced in emerging economies but consumed in the West increased from 2.5 per cent of the share of rich countries in 1990 to 16 per cent in 2010.

In the UK, fossil fuel CO₂ emissions grew 3.8 per cent in 2010 but were 14 per cent below their 1990 levels. However, emissions from the trade of goods and services grew from 5 per cent of the emissions produced locally in 1990 to 46 per cent in 2010 – overcompensating the reductions in local emissions. Emissions in the UK were 20 per cent above their 1990 levels when emissions from trade are taken into account.

“Global CO₂ emissions since 2000 are tracking the high end of the projections used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which far exceed two degrees warming by 2100,” said co-author Corinne Le Quéré, director of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research and professor at the University of East Anglia. “Yet governments have pledged to keep warming below two degrees to avoid the most dangerous aspects of climate change such as widespread water stress and sea level rise, and increases in extreme climatic events.”

Glen Peters, of the Centre for International Climate and Environmental Research in Norway, and lead author said: “Many saw the global financial crisis as an opportunity to move the global economy away from persistent and high emissions growth, but the return to emissions growth in 2010 suggests the opportunity was not exploited.”

Sergio Abranches

As the first segment of COP17 comes to an inconclusive closing, negotiators are adding the bits and pieces coming out of their talks to figure out where they stand. They are working to narrow down the options to be presented to the ministers for further deliberation during the political segment, starting on Monday.

Although there has been fair progress on several technical matters, consensus is still lacking on the fundamentals. Nobody expects grand decisions to be made here in Durban, but a reiteration of a complete deadlock might severely damage UNFCCC’s credibility. All parties know they’ll need to arrive at a package deal with meaningful and practical results on finance and technology, as well as clear guidance as to future steps towards building a global climate change regime.

A second period of commitment under the Kyoto Protocol seems hard to obtain. Negotiators are considering some legal solutions to avoid a gap among commitment periods. There has been considerable agreement among parties that this gap should be avoided. Although a fully ratifiable amendment seems unlikely, negotiators could still decide on a transition mechanism to keep the Protocol alive.

Japan has insisted yesterday that the way forward is to start working immediately on a new comprehensive legally-binding agreement. Japan chief envoy Masahiko Horie proposed that COP17 establishes a new working group to draft this agreement that should be completed as soon as possible. The baseline for the agreement would be the Cancun Agreement.

A delegate from one of the BASIC countries said that it is imperative to look for a suitable solution to get the United States aboard, and convince the EU and other parties to agree to a second period of commitment. He hinted that there has been some work towards devising a legal form as strong as possible but short of requiring ratification. The negotiator said many feel uneasy with the possibility of deciding on a new treaty, even with support from the US, only to see the Senate in Washington refusing to ratify the treaty later on.

A non-ratifiable agreement would seem a more practical and working solution than the demand for a fully legally-binding agreement.

According to Reuters, China’s lead negotiator Su Wei said yesterday that “since the EU is the only group of parties that is ready to consider a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol we are ready and willing to engage constructively with the EU.” Su Wei is also reported to have said that China does not “rule out the possibility of [a] legally binding [agreement]. It is possible for us, but it depends on the negotiations.”

Finding a middle ground on major issues seems unlikely on the light of what has happened during the first week. Usually deferring decisions to the ministers at the political segment is no solution. Countries will hardly change their views on relevant issues on the spot. If there is any card to play on the second week, it has already been decided ahead of the meeting, at home. Ministers may or may not play these cards depending on the moves from other key players. But they will hardly change game at this stage of the process.

Sergio Abranches, from Durban

After a Thursday of rumors and very few press briefings, the technical segment of COP17 closes today with no clear outlines of a deal. A delegate said negotiators feel like walking a minefield with parties holding to incompatible bottom-line positions. Several key negotiators said yesterday that a relatively good package deal is likely to be approved, but they can’t foresee what it may contain.

A negotiator from the BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) said the technical segment is moving forward faster than in other COPs, but final decisions will come the hard way. There are no easy ways here, he added. Another negotiator acknowledged a deal is likely, but so far it is impossible to know what it will contain.

The European Union has reiterated its support for a multilateral, rules-based, legally-binding treaty encompassing all countries. Australia and Japan supported this new legally-binding instrument, with specific obligations for a larger set of parties than the Kyoto Protocol.

On the side the EU and other key parties have been trying to convince both the United States and China to sign on to a roadmap leading to this new treaty by 2015. The US negotiator said on the same stocktaking informal meeting that his country supports a legally-binding agreement including commitments from all major economies. He may be referring to the countries that participate in the Major Economies Forum (MEF).

On a radio interview, US chief climate negotiator Todd Stern, has said that his country “is not prepared to go forward on the basis of the old-style agreement, which essentially had a firewall between all developed countries and all developing countries.” All these words could be summarized as “we want China into the agreement”.

This does not seem an impossible demand any longer. An expert with a Chinese government think tank, Xu Huaqing, has told China Daily that China is likely to agree to a quantified target to limit its greenhouse gas emissions after 2020. Negotiators here in Durban have been hinting that China will go one step forward towards accepting to be a party into a future legally-binding agreement. It would depend on a similar move from the United States.

These same negotiators think that the US could also make a step forward. If both do move, the European Union proposed roadmap may well be the way all parties commit in principle to a future deal. Negotiators from the BASIC countries have held an informal talk with Europe “to better understand their idea of a roadmap”. On a meeting of G77+China several parties have raised concerns that this proposal for a new treaty would mean changing the Climate Convention to remove the clause on differentiated obligations. G77 countries consider this clause irremovable and non-negotiable.

It seems the EU negotiators have convinced the BASIC delegates that this is not the case. The new treaty would bind all, but with differentiated obligations. The BASIC envoys seemed satisfied, but they will have a hard time convincing the more recalcitrant and/or unconfident G77 parties. Reaching a consensus on the most relevant issues within the amorphous and heterogeneous G77 has become almost impossible.

Lack of consensus within the G77 may not however be an insurmountable obstacle to a deal. As the group breaks into more coherent coalitions, such as the BASIC, the AOSIS (small island states), the Less Developed Countries (LDCs), fractionalization may lead to a better understanding. After all, what is really being negotiated is a future agreement binding the  developed and the BASIC countries. If China moves, Brazil, India, and South Africa are very likely to move in the same direction. The BASIC countries seem almost ready to do such a move, provided they are assured their binding obligations will be differentiated quantitatively and/or in terms of their timing.

Several G77 countries have been demanding an agreement binding all major emitters, including the larger developing countries. Although G77+China is a negotiating group, vote can be split, and a non-veto instance could be negotiated among them. Such a deal would very likely depend on other issues being drafted as asked by these other G77 countries. They are far more concerned, for instance, with the non-discriminatory distribution of the Green Climate Fund resources, adaptation, and technological cooperation.

Whether decision on all open issues will converge to a satisfactory package deal by the end of COP17 remains to be seen. There still are contradictory signs. But it is fair to say that negotiators are trying hard to clear a path leading to such a deal. It is not an easy one, but it falls within the range of possibilities.

Sergio Abranches, from Durban

A question people frequently ask me is why even when it looks as all countries negotiating a global climate regime say they want a good solution at a COP (Convention of the Parties), and they seem to make quite similar proposals, the talks end in a logjam?

This question has more than a single answer. The most common is that although negotiators are saying they want a good result, they are not totally sincere. In fact they are unable to support a good agreement, from the standpoint of climate science, because it would harm domestically dominant economic and political interests. It is a plausible explanation, and it is probably at least partially true.

A second answer would say that although negotiators are apparently saying they want the same or a very similar result, in fact what they really want is different, and contradicts what others really want. When, as an example, they say they want “the full operationalization of the Cancun Agreement” they do not mean the same thing. Each has a different interpretation of how this operationalization should be accomplished. In real life, many parties have actually said in Durban, at COP17, that they want the “full operationalization of the Cancun agreements. But they disagree on practically almost all the proposed ways to operationalize the agreement. There is disagreement on how to operationalize the Green Climate Fund or the Technology Center and Network, or the Transparency Regime (MRV). In real life, instead of consensus on the “full operationalization  of the Cancun Agreement”, there is dissensus. This is also a plausible explanation for the deadlock, and it is probably at least partially true as well.

A third answer would be that even though all parties want the same objective result, and their interpretation of the outcome is very similar, there is a problem of trust among them that makes them perceive each other’s point of view as very different from their own. This third explanation is also plausible and it is probably at least partially true as well.

From a purely analytical standpoint, the most interesting and intriguing hypothesis is the one that supposes that all negotiators sincerely want more or less the same objective result, and nevertheless the negotiations stop in a dead end. Let us suppose further that there is at least one solution that is balanced and fair, regarding the parties common but differentiated obligations and historical responsibilities ( i.e. their past and present greenhouse gas emissions), as well as their level of social and economic development. And that solution meets the minimum scientific requirements to cope with the threat of climate change. Fair and balanced mean that all parties would have to make a similar and proportional effort to meet their targets, and their gains would be commensurate to their respective efforts.

Even in this situation, if negotiators perceive the playing field differently from what it objectively is, and see their counterparts’ targets as lighter or less costly than theirs,  they would rather veto the solution, than have it approved. Remember that the unanimity clause turns all players into equally powerful veto players. The talks would again end in a deadlock.

Observing the climate change negotiations one can clearly see that there is a problem of reciprocal evaluation and perception, apart from imbalances in what parties are proposing. This lack of trust appears in typical attitudes like “you first”, or “I’ll do if you do”. Negotiators frame similar goals differently from each other. Like  in the example of the demand for making the Cancun Agreement “fully operational”. All use the same language meaning different things. Most of the negotiation effort aims at arriving at a common framing for each item, a tiresome and time-consuming task.

At present, negotiators are far from reaching a point they all are at a relatively balanced position vis à vis each other in terms of obligations and commitments. The United States’s emission reduction pledges, for instance, fall short of the other developed parties’. The degree of commitment the US is willing to make to enter into a legally binding accord is also smaller than other developed parties’. China, Brazil, and India, large present and future carbon emitters refuse to accept binding obligations.

But let us suppose they all arrive at an objectively balanced position, and still they aren’t able to close a deal. How to explain this frustrating outcome?

All start from relatively comparable starting bids. Their respective bids can be objectively seen as balanced considering their level of social and economic development, and historic responsibilities. Every party sincerely wishes to reach point “X”, that represent a balanced and fair deal. All would have to make a comparable effort to reach “X”.   On the figure below the arrows point to “X”, indicating that it is everyone’s target point. The arrows are also the same size, indicating a comparable “price” to pay for “X”.

The letter indicate some major players: “E”, for Europe; “U”, for USA; “J” for Japan; “B”, for BASIC; “A”, for African Union, “O”, for AOSIS; “C”, for Canada; Au, for “Australia” (list not supposed to be exhaustive, an illustration only):

The problem is that each negotiator doesn’t view the table of negotiations as in the first figure. They see it as in the figure below:

The figure uses the BASIC group of countries as an example (could be any other party, for that matter). The perception of this negotiator is that the others are asking him to do more than they are willing to do. In other words they feel like the developed countries are trying to shift the burden to curb emissions to the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) and are evading their responsibility, when they should be leading the effort to reduce GHG emissions. In the hypothetical scenario this perception would be objectively wrong, but it is subjectively what the group believes is happening, and they’d veto “X” although “X” is a fair, balanced, and effective solution for a global climate change regime.

The next figure illustrates another similar situation:

The US is now the negotiator, and perceives the situation as one in which the BASIC is being asked far less than what has been asked from the US. In spite of the fact that the US and China have been emitting a similar absolute volume of carbon, China and the BASIC refuse to accept binding emissions targets, but demand that the US enters into a binding agreement. There will never be a situation in the foreseeable future in which the US and China would be asked to commit to the same absolute amount of emissions reductions, because of the principle of historic responsibilities and common but differentiated obligations. The BASIC will eventually accept binding targets in the future, but never equal absolute volumes of emissions cuts. This principle is the ground rule for decision-making under the Climate Convention, so it has to be observed to reach an acceptable solution. It is likely that even if the situation is one in which what is asked from the US is objectively comparable to what is asked from China, Brazil and India, under the aforementioned Convention clauses, the US would veto “X”.

These scenarios illustrate how difficult it is to reach a fair, balanced, and effective solution to a climate change deal under the Climate Convention. It is particularly difficult when a policy of maximum efficiency to cope with climate change does not have the support of a domestic political majority. Domestic support to climate change policies is key for a party to change the framing of the negotiation at the Climate Convention. Countries with a strong political majority in favor of such a policy are more likely to yield, and to have a less distorted perception of the other’s standing

Both in the US and Brazil the polls are showing that a majority of the public at large supports an ambitious climate change policy. But public opinion has not been translated into an active political majority. Opinion alone doesn’t move governments. It can inspire electoral campaign promises, but not generate enough pressure for elected leaders to convert promises into policies.

Sergio Abranches, from Durban

The first day fully dedicated to informal consultations and negotiations in Durban, South Africa, where COP17 is convened, has produced faint signs that some progress may be possible over the next days. Some negotiators said today that there has been some movement forward regarding what they call technical issues.

Some were hopeful that tangible progress could happen in the days ahead to close a package deal comprising the Green Climate Fund, and the Technology Center and Network, both deemed necessary to support developing countries do adapt to climate change and to adopt clean technology and renewable energy as they develop their economy. On what is considered to be the political agenda, regarding a second period of commitment under the Kyoto Protocol, and a new global climate change agreement under the Climate Convention, there has been no progress at all. Very subtle signaling from some key parties have, however, raised hope that some progress may be obtained over the weekend.

The chief negotiator for the European Union, Arthur Runge Metzger, has acknowledged the expectation that a package deal of financial and technological resources could be approved soon. He said that the European Union would rather have a different solution on some points of the document on the governing structure of the Green Climate Fund, but would approve the formula presented by the Transitional Committee created in Cancun to design the fund. The EU would like, in turn, that the Green Climate Fund could start operating as early in 2012 as possible.

Other negotiators argue the Europeans are eager to have the technical package deal wrapped up to have something tangible to offer its African partners. And what the African countries need the most is financial and technological help for adaptation to climate change.

Ambassador André Corrêa do Lago, Brazil’s chief climate negotiator sees a financial and technological package deal as more likely now. He explained that negotiators are trying to accommodate corrections some parties say are a necessary condition to approve the package, but without having to reopen the document.

Reopening a document on a COP is no simple matter. Negotiations follow a rule saying that “nothing is closed until everything has been closed”. If a clause is reopened all other are automatically set to be rediscussed as well. This could represent losing months of work in a single hour. Diplomats are now trying to figure out a way to make corrections on some points of the document without declaring it reopened. Making corrections on a closed document is no easy feat, but, if there is good will and no party objects, diplomats have a few tricks that would make it to happen

On the political track of the convention, discussing a new period of commitment under the Kyoto Protocol, and a new global agreement under the Climate Convention, progress has been far less visible. But negotiators give notice that there have been a few subtle moves that might indicate the possibility of some progress in the days to come. A phrase showing a very discreet change of attitude on a statement, a subtle use of words during a conversation are read as signs that a party may be more open to remove a veto and become more cooperative under certain conditions. Like a discreet nod of the head or a slight wave of hands to incrementally raise the bid on a very disputed auction, these signs are used by negotiators to keep talking in the direction so indicated as more conducive to an agreement.

These very subtle cues seem to indicate that the European Union, Australia and New Zealand could support a second period of commitment under the Kyoto Protocol. This outcome for the Kyoto Protocol would require that the United States agree to a future binding agreement, and that China, once seeing such a move from the US would also point to the possibility of being a party to this future agreement. If China does move in this direction, Brasil, India and South Africa would follow suit. If the US and the BASIC countries agree to a future agreement, then all other developed countries unwilling to be a party to a second period of commitment under the Kyoto Protocol would also agree to be a party to the new agreement. Hopefully, says a negotiator who supports a second period under Kyoto, even would ultimately sign in to a second period.

The tricky question would be the timeline for all these new moves. Some negotiators think that the only feasible date for a future agreement would be 2020. Others consider 2020 too late, and ask that the new global agreement be signed in 2015. This has a relationship with the scope of the second period of commitment under the Kyoto Protocol. If the magic date becomes 2015, those countries advocating a five-year second period of commitment would probably prevail. If the deadline becomes 2020, it is likely that the second period of commitment would be eighth years long as the first.

No one is envisaging a game changer in Durban. What they see is just a bridge to cross these troubled economic times. After the crisis has passed, negotiators would likely be more willing to commit to more ambitious emission reduction targets. A global climate change regime that could bridge the “ambitions gap”, that is the gap between what science considers necessary to face the dangers of climate change, and what the countries are willing to do is still too far away on the horizon.  The goal in Durban is to approve a practical package deal, and try to prevent fatal damage to the credibility of the UNFCCC.

Sergio Abranches, from Durban

The European Union has set its conditions to support a second period of commitment for the Kyoto Protocol, on a press conference, in Durban, where COP17 will officially start tomorrow. 

EU chief negotiator, Arthur Runge-Metzger said that Europe supports the Kyoto Protocol, but won’t keep it in place alone. “The Kyoto Protocol is useful, and can work”, he added. “It needs improvement in some areas, but more work needs to be done” to get to a meaningful agreement on climate change. “Kyoto covers only 25 percent of emissions”, and several countries have announced they will not be a part to a second period of commitment. The European Union covers no more than 17 percent of emissions. The problem with emissions is not in Europe, he completed.

The negotiator for Poland, the country that is now on the European presidency, Tomasz Chruszczow said that a new agreement should bring 100 percent of emissions under the same legal umbrella. “We need 100 percent of those who emit to participate on the mitigation efforts.” To the European Union, the Kyoto Protocol could be a transition, he conceded. But there are realistic and necessary conditions for the European Union to support a second period of commitment, he added.

Runge-Metzger specified the conditions: to fully operationalize the Cancun Agreements, putting in place the Green Climate Fund, and to clarify how it will finance adaptation, a demand from the developing countries, and the technology mechanism; to complete approval of REDD+; to clarify and specify transparency mechanisms, “what we know as MRV, monitoring, reporting and verification. These conditions, according to both negotiators, can be fulfilled in Durban. “There is a lot of technical work to do, and we hope major progress can be made this week” on technical issues, said Runge-Metzger.

The european negotiators have also mentioned a more complicated political condition.  “We need a roadmap to get to a new international climate agreement”, one that reaches all major emitters, said the chief european negotiator. This agreement should be signed until 2015, and be put in force no later than 2020. “We will be talking here about engagement, not marriage”, he illustrated. Answering a reporter Runge-Metzger said that the idea was to get the new agreement ready as soon as possible, but no later than 2015, and to enforce it also as soon as possible, but no later than 2020.  The roadmap should be stronger, broader and have more clear commitments than the Bali Roadmap, he explained. Chruszczow said that “we cannot live with [the] Bali [Roadmap] forever”.

This new roadmap for an agreement to be ready by 2015, and in force by 2020, will likely occupy most of the talks for the whole week. Developing countries will very likely strongly oppose the European proposal. It can be a double-edged one: it can lead to a new crisis of confidence among the parties, or it can be the outline of what the Durban outcome will be.

Sergio Abranches

COP17 in Durban is braced to start dealing with a deadlocked agenda. Negotiators will have to find a middle ground to prevent the talks to collapse and wreck the United Nation’s architecture for climate change policy and politics.

The central focus will be the second period of commitment of the Kyoto Protocol. Developed countries will arrive at Durban with diverging positions among themselves on this issue. U.S. negotiators simply say that Kyoto is not on their agenda because the U.S. Congress chose not to ratify the Protocol.  Some parties to the Protocol are saying they will not adhere to a second period of commitment. Their priority is a new international binding agreement that reaches all large emitters, including the U.S. and the major developing economies. According to Bloomberg’s Kim Chapman, Todd Stern, U.S.’s lead negotiator, told reporters during a Nov. 18 briefing in Arlington, Virginia that “it’s premature to decide on what the ultimate legal form [of a new international agreement] might be until you have a much better sense of what the content would be”. Stern said that any binding accord in which the U.S. participates must be “highly symmetrical” and require mandatory action from all major emitters, such as China, and not only from industrialized economies.

The European Union is open to commit to a second phase for the Kyoto Protocol, but wouldn’t risk to be alone, as the other parties maintain their decision to stay out of it. European Commissioner for Climate Action Connie Hedegaard said that the EU won’t commit to a new set of targets under Kyoto unless countries including the U.S., China and other big emitters agree on a pathway to a new binding treaty.

There is a clear and present risk that developed countries fail to reach a consensus on a second period of commitment. In other words it is not only a divide between developed and developing countries that is preventing parties to break the logjam on the Kyoto Protocol.

This divide does exist though. Developing countries say they will not start talking about a new international deal before there is a second period of commitment. There appears to be a strong consensus among them regarding the centrality of a second period of commitment of the Kyoto Protocol, as a sine qua non for the continuation of the talks. All the relevant groups representing developing countries have decided on their preparatory meetings that their priority, and imperative condition, in Durban would be the approval of a second period of commitment.

But this consensus is one of the few points that hold together the sum total of developing countries. These countries under the umbrella of G77+China comprise a very heterogeneous group. Whenever the G77+China speaks for them all it will defend only a few broad points that are able to reconcile very different clusters of interests, diverse needs, a wide spectrum of financial, technical, economic, and political capabilities, and contrasting levels of vulnerability to climate change. One can expect a more coherent framing of  substantive negotiating positions, that could better represent these contrasting domestic realities, when these groups break into more compatible representations such as the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), the AOSIS (small island states), the African Union, and the LDC (least developed countries) during negotiations.

There is a growing uneasiness with the idea that developed countries are negotiating among themselves a new climate change agreement to become operational in 2020. This behind the scenes negotiation risks to create a grave crisis of confidence that could further endanger the Durban talks. It was the realization that a Copenhagen agreement was negotiated within a small group of developed countries through an initiative of Lars Løkke Rasmussen, Denmark’s prime-minister at the time, that triggered a crisis of confidence that ultimately led Copenhagen to fail.

The solution to this logjam has a double path. One to take steps to ensure all parties that no deal previously closed within closed doors among a few parties will be tabled. The other to set a new roadmap having on its design both a transition period for the Kyoto Protocol and a frame of reference for a future all-encompassing binding protocol or treaty.

South Africa’s Environment Minister Edna Molewa recognized “that a comprehensive legal agreement will not be reached,” in Durban. That said, “South Africa envisages that” negotiations “pave the way for a comprehensive multilateral, rules-based climate regime.”

This is a tricky move. There already is a roadmap, drawn in Bali, which has not been completed, and it is unlikely it will ever be. A new roadmap would have to somehow be stronger, more doable, and substantive than the Bali’s work plan to gain credibility.

Two operational points could help to wrap up the new roadmap on a satisfying, though meager, package deal. Some progress on the transparency issue – monitoring, reporting, and verifying mechanisms – that has started to be negotiated in Copenhagen, was rediscussed in Cancun, but still has a long way to go. Both were an important part of the Copenhagen Agreement , and further reinforced by the Cancun Agreements. They are: the full operationalization of the Climate Technology Centre and Network, and the  Green Climate Fund. Finishing the job on both would represent an important step forward, and could help the parties to agree on a frame of reference and a time frame for a new climate change accord.

The Green Climate Fund is additionaly related to a crucial issue regarding global climate change policies: that of adaptation. Channelling public, multilateral, and private long-term financing towards developing countries for greenhouse gas emission reductions, and new clean technologies (mitigation) is not really difficult. Finance for adaptation, that is to deal with the effects present and future of climate change has been lacking. There is a permanent complaint from developing countries that negotiations have been giving far more weight to mitigation than to adaptation. And the poorer or more vulnerable countries desperately need money and technology for adaptation.

Mitigation is an issue for the big players, developed and developing. To put it simply it is an issue for the G20 or Major Economies Forum (MEF). Adaptation is a critical issue for the long-term well being of the majority of the developing countries.

The roadmap, as well as the financial and technological mechanisms, would have to be more clear and direct in addressing adaptation needs for a new deal to become possible.