Sérgio Abranches

The election of Dilma Rousseff, Lula’s personal pick and former top aide, as next President of Brazil will trigger several important political shifts in the country.

The president-elect, once in office, will face challenges much harder than Lula has ever faced in the Presidency. For the first time someone without previous political experience and leadership will be seating legitimately on the presidential desk with full power.

The Brazilian system of governance is a presidential coalition government. Congress is strong, almost every policy the President plans to enforce requires a law authorizing or enabling the policy. The President has the power to initiate legislation, but the majority to approve presidential initiatives depends on a multiparty coalition in both Houses of Congress. President-elect Dilma Rousseff has said that her multiparty electoral alliance will become her governing coalition. This is not an automatic process, though. It requires a lot of political bargaining around ministerial posts, offices in the second and third tiers of government, as well as shares in the budget. The larger the representation of the pork barrel-seeking parties in the coalition, the harder it is to strike a deal. The major clientele-oriented party in her coalition, PMDB, is a federation of bosses of state party machines, very difficult to hold together and utterly ungovernable under stress. This process of coalition formation requires plenty of political savvy and bargaining skills. It will clearly be president-elect Rousseff’s first major test.

Looking to the bigger picture, the most important outcomes of this electoral process are the changes it trigers.

First of all, there will be a tremendous change of style. President Lula is a mobilization leader and he has relied almost 100% on the motivational dimension of the relationship between the Presidency and the people. He has never acted as a dedicated chief executive officer. He was more like a strategic leader. He spent more time on public events, such as inauguration of public projects and new plants of private corporations, celebrations, fairs and conventions, and on international travels, than at the office. He has a highly developed political instinct that balances his political shortcomings, and compensates for his lack of interest on the daily routines of the Presidency.

President-elect Dilma has so far proved to have no mobilization skills, and to be a poor motivational speaker. She is the kind of office-centered CEO. She likes to look into the details, and is unlikely to delegate as much as Lula did. One should not expect her Chief of Staff to be as powerful and independent a Chief of Staff as she was under president Lula. She has a more formal techno-bureaucratic attitude that will very soon contrast with Lula’s streetwise style of motivational presidency.

A second important difference is that Dilma is more ideological and less pragmatic than Lula has ever been. Lula was an AFL-CIO type of union leader, far different from the socialist and communist European union leaders of the 1960’s and 1970’s. Dilma still likes to think herself as belonging to what she calls “the camp of the left”. She has updated her views, as almost everybody in the left has done, but she is very likely less flexible than Lula.

Third, Lula was greater than PT and Dilma is smaller than the party. She owns her election far more to Lula’s popularity than to her political skills and capabilities to communicate with voters. She also has a temper and that may generate stress and friction as PT will try to impose party controls on her presidency.

PT, the Workers’ Party, is entering a whole new stage of its political life. For the first time  since 1989 it will not have Lula running a presidential campaign. Lula ran for the presidency in 1989, 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2006, being elected in the last two. From 1990 to 2002, Lula led the opposition. Over the last eight years he was the President of the Nation. Perhaps even Lula himself is uncertain about what he will be doing from January 2^nd, 2011 onwards.

The immediate challenge will be how to host a former president, known for his voluntarism and lack of personal discipline. Lula’s informality has led him to breach all democratic limits to the role an incumbent President could have on a presidential campaign to support his candidate. He disqualified the opposition, and used the government apparatus and state-owned companies to favor the official candidate. He always acts on impulse and instinct alone, and he seems to need public attention all the time. This phase of Lula being out of the Presidential office will be a testing one to Lula, the Party, and president Dilma Rousseff for quite some time. He may cast a giant shadow over the new government and the party as well.

Although Lula cannot be discarded as a presidential candidate in 2014, the Workers’ Party will have at some point to start looking for new leaders and to design feasible alternative courses for party life without Lula. “Lulism” will always remain a factor beyond the party’s reach as long as Lula stays on active political life. And the President is giving no signs that he will simply retire. The moment Lula recedes into the background the party will start facing stress and competition among its several internal factions.

At the same time, PT will also have to deal with the growth of competitors on the center-left side of the political spectrum. PSB, the Brazilian Socialist Party, has elected six state governors. PT elected 5. PSB’s parliamentary gains weren’t that significant, the party elected 34 representatives, and four senators. But it has more political leaders able to run a competitive presidential campaign than PT. Some were elected state governors. The critical aspect is that to put in place checks and balances on the power and influence of PMDB, the major clientele-oriented party on the new coalition, PT and Dilma will have to amplify PSB’s influence and power.

PT will not be alone on the road towards a new and yet unknown future. Its main adversary, the social democratic PSDB, is also on that road, even though heading to a different destination. With José Serra’s second failure on a presidential pledge – he ran against Lula in 2002 – the party’s founding fathers from the state of São Paulo will loose ground. The São Paulo section, once led by former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso, has been the hegemonic force within the party since its creation. Now it ran out of alternatives. Its other leader, Geraldo Alckmin, who ran against Lula in 2006, was elected governor of the state of São Paulo, defeating PT and Lula’s candidate, former senator Aloizio Mercadante. But the party does not look at Alckmin as its champion to run the 2014 presidential elections.

All eyes have already turned to former governor of the state of Minas Gerais, now elected senator, Aécio Neves. Two other politicians from the party’s second generation, i.e. the generation after the founding fathers, were elected governors of their states: Beto Richa, governor-elect of the southern state of Paraná, and Marconi Perillo, elected governor of the midwestern state of Goiás. Richa was the mayor of the capital city of Paraná, Curitiba. His father, José Richa, already deceased, was one of the party’s most influential founding fathers, celebrated for his political savvy. Marconi Perillo is a senator, he has been governor before, and now has defeated the powerful machine of PMDB in his state, running against the party’s boss Íris Resende. Resende was publicly and strongly supported by President Lula. The president deeply resented Perillo’s role in the Senate as a fierce opponent to himself and his government. He played a strong role accusing Lula of direct participation in the scandal of political corruption known as “mensalão”. The scandal negatively marked Lula’s first term. It involved monthly payments to parties in Congress to buy their allegiance to the government. It is under judicial review and there are 40 former members of Lula’s government and PT officials being prosecuted, among them the still influential, former party Secretary-General and Lula’s first Chief of Staff, José Dirceu.

Both PT and PSDB are on the verge of a power transition and will also experience a process of power diffusion. For PT, the transition and diffusion of power will take longer, because Lula will continue to hold most of the power and influence in the party and outside it. For PSDB, transition and diffusion will move faster. First there will be a transition of power from São Paulo’s leadership towards Aécio Neves. He will clearly attract the majority of the Party’s active forces, that see him as their best bet for 2014. Although Neves will likely be the major political attractor within the party, power will also be more decentralized, and we should expect Richa, Perillo, the new governor of Minas Gerais, Antonio Anastasia and other emerging social democrat leadership to become more influential and to have a stronger voice in the party’s decisions. Power will become more diffused within the party.

The first presidential election without Lula as a candidate will cause major waves of change. It wouldn’t be an exaggeration to put up an alert for a political tsunami. Large tectonic plates under the ground of Brazil’s two major parties are already shifting and moving. These undercurrents are likely to generate several waves that will deeply change the parties’ landscape and the political environment. The unlikely scenario will be one of continuity and stability. How strong and how deep change will be it remains to be seen. But a substantial amount of change should be expected. As one says: “shift happens”.

Preliminary satellite data points to the smaller amount of logging since measurement began. But can it be sustained?

Sergio Abranches

INPE – The National Space Research Agency reports a major reduction of deforestation rates in the Brazilian Amazon. Preliminary satellite data shows that total deforestation from August 2008 to July 2009 reached the lowest level since measurement began: 7,008 sq. km. Although the government, in full electoral drive, attributes this sharp drop in logging activity to policies of land property regularization, it has other causes.

The government is also celebrating these figures as a durable achievement, which is unlikely to be true. The major factor behind such a low number was the recession, that has dramatically reduced housing activities, the major source of demand for Amazon timber – both legal and illegal. The world economic crisis has also substantially reduced foreign demand for agricultural commodities, at the same time their prices fell significantly. There is a historic correlation between agricultural commodities prices and deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon.

Deforestation has been, nevertheless, on a downward trend since 2005. The two major economic drivers of deforestation in Brazil, soybean plantation and cattle ranching are under relative control due to successful action from Greenpeace. First the NGO has targeted soybean production, and led major consumers such as MacDonald’s, and its major supplier, Cargill, to join other large companies on a soy moratorium that is now 3 years old. Earlier this year, Greenpeace targeted cattle retailers, and as a result the larger supermarket chains Wal-Mart, Pão de Açúcar and Carrefour announced a ban on beef from ranchers and slaughterhouses accused of deforestation by state prosecutors. The government became a part of these initiatives after they were already in force.

This downward trend has also resulted from policies the of the command and control introduced by former Environment Minister Marina Silva, and maintained by the present minister Carlos Minc. Minc has also increased Federal Police and Environmental Agents’ raids against cattle ranchers and illegal loggers in the Amazon that began with so-called Operation Arch of Fire created by Marina Silva.

Among the most effective actions taken by the former minister was the resolution by the Monetary Authority prohibiting financing of farms and companies found to be illegally logging.

But it is clear that deforestation will only drop on a sustained way after a whole new development policy for the region is implemented.

Although this lower level of deforestation is good news, it is still too high. According to Warren Dean (With Broadax and Firebrand: The Destruction of the Brazilian Atlantic Forest) it took 150 years for the sugar cane producers to destroy 7,500 sq. km of the Atlantic Rainforest, between 1700 to 1850. In other words the government celebrates as a great achievement the fact that we are logging in one year the same amount of trees that were cut from the Atlantic Rainforest over 150 years. (Thanks to @claudioangelo for reminding us).

The government has been sounding its trumpets at every opportunity regarding the environmental agenda, since former Environment Minister, Marina Silva, quit Lula’s party, PT, to join the Green Party – PV on a bid to the Presidency in 2010. Suddenly a government that has always been aloof to environmental and climate change issues moved them to the center of its political marketing agenda.

This newly found concern for the environment will likely influence the government’s decision to commit to a quantifiable action aiming at curbing carbon emissions in Copenhagen. A good sign of this propensity for a shift on Brazil’s traditional diplomatic state of denial is that Lula has appointed his minister Dilma Roussef as head of the Brazilian delegation. Dilma Roussef, Lula’s Chief of Staff has been personally picked by the president as his party’s presidential candidate. This decision is likely to be announced later today. Tomorrow president Lula leaves for a visit to France, and minister Roussef goes from Paris to Copenhagen for preparatory talks on the way to COP15.

These are all incremental improvements that will require further work to become truly meaningful. The good news is that inertia has been broken. Underneath a heavy clutter of green washing and political marketeering there is some progress that may prove useful in the future, after politics gives room to sound policy.

Amid strong controversies among his ministers, president Lula has supposedly concluded a cabinet meeting, last Tuesday, by saying “we’ll move ahead, but first bring me a consensual policy with figures all of you agree with.”

Sergio Abranches

The decision was postponed to November 14. Meanwhile government officials will try to agree on a set of actions and figures that go beyond the commitment 80% reduction  of deforestation by 2020.

The new commitment would include the agricultural sector (land use change), by means of a program of quality and productivity gains to reduce greenhouse gases emissions. The program could include new production practices, increasing non-tillage farming, and direct seeding; changing use of fertilizers; fighting agricultural wildfire, especially on sugar cane plantations; and recovery of spoiled land to move the agricultural frontier without forcing deforestation.

Another action considered almost fully approved is to ban wood from deforestation in the production of charcoal for steel mills. Government officials are labeling it “green steel”. President Lula has recently criticized private giant iron ore mining company Vale, for not producing steel for export. He and his Chief of Staff (also his presidential candidate to be) Dilma Roussef are staunch supporters of steel production.

Some sources have told me there wasn’t too much conflict over goals or over the idea of an enlarged commitment to be taken to Copenhagen. Most of the divergence centered on figures and procedures. The meeting was adjourned so that the different ministries could get together and agree on both.

The major source of opposition to an extended commitment continues to come from the Foreign Ministry. They argue that the Kyoto Protocol does not impose such obligations on Brazil. President Lula’s political advisors, however, are reported to have said that there is great expectation in the Brazilian society about a new attitude in Copenhagen. The president was apparently sensitive to the argument, because he is very fond of his domestic popularity, and also because he is already looking at the 2010 presidential elections.

Brazil would present a new and more ambitious set of NAMAs – Nationally Appropriated Actions, that, although not considered technically as legally binding commitments, are “quantifiable, reportable and verifiable commitments.”

Although there are those who say the government has already decided to commit only with the 80% reduction of deforestation in the Amazon, I heard from more than one official source that the president wishes to go beyond that.

The expectation is that actions and corresponding quantitative figures, consensually supported by all ministers involved, should be finally evaluated with the president next November 14.

President Lula’s last words were “let’s move ahead, but bring me a consensual policy with figures all of you agree with.”

The Brazilian electoral law has set October 3 as the deadline for those who want to run in the 2010 general elections to decide on their party affiliation.

Sérgio Abranches

Over the last few days several important announcements came from government authorities, business and political leaderships either choosing a party, or changing party affiliation.

The Chairman of the Brazilian Central Bank, Henrique Meirelles has announced his affiliation to PMDB yesterday. PMDB is the clientele-politics, pork-barrel, catchall party that presently holds the larger share of seats in both the House and the Senate. The party has a pivotal role in President Lula’s coalition. President Lula has tried to convince him not to reenter electoral politics next year. He had been elected a House member in the 2002 elections, before being invited to head the Central Bank. He didn’t even take the oath of office as a Representative.

Lula asked his Central Banker to wait for the victory of his presidential candidate Dilma Roussef, promising Meirelles a very important role in the new government. It seems Meirelles has more confidence on his own electoral chances in his home state, than on the Ms. Roussef’s, who has been handpicked by Lula himself. Knowing that he was decided to get a party affiliation “to let the door open to a future candidacy”, President Lula asked him to join PMDB. Meirelles said he will annouce next March whether he will leave the Central Bank to run for office. He is expected to run for governor of this home-state, Goiás, or, alternatively, to seek a Senate seat.

Celso Amorim, Lula’s Minister for Foreign Affairs,  who masterminded the disastrous operation that led the Brazilian Embassy in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, to host ousted president Manuel Zelaya, has announced his affiliation to the Worker’s Party (PT). President Lula is one of the founding fathers of PT. Mr. Amorim was formerly affiliated to PMDB, but has never participated in elections.

PT, however, has lost more affiliates than it acquired. PMDB is also losing several important regional leaderships. Both parties are paying a high price for their protection to Senate’s Chairman, José Sarney (PMDB-AP), who has been charged of corruption and administrative wrongdoing during his tenure. Internal divisions regarding the party’s standing on the next presidential elections are also taking their toll from PMDB. Lula wants PMDB to support his candidate and offer the name for Vice-president on her ticket. But several party leaders are supporting São Paulo governor José Serra’s bid.

The most celebrated wave of affiliations involved the small Brazilian Green Party (PV). Former Environment Minister and Amazon Icon, Marina Silva, has joined the party last month, to run for the Presidency. Yesterday, several important business leaders, all well known for their support of sustainable business and social and environmental corporate responsibility, have also jointed the party. They are all adhering to Marina Silva’s presidential candidacy, rather than to PV’s former platform.

The party is going through a thorough internal power shift determined by Marina Silva’s arrival. This sudden emergence of PV to the frontline has been correctly attributed to the “Marina factor”. She attracted Guilherme Leal, co-chairman of the board of cosmetics firm Natura, to the party as a possible vice-presidential nominee. Also joined PV the executive-director of Klabin, a Brazilian paper and pulp giant, who acts as CEO of the NGO SOS Mata Atlântica (SOS Atlantic Rainforest); Ricardo Young, CEO of the Ethos Institute, dedicated to promote corporate social responsibility and ethical management among Brazilian firms; Fernando Simões, CEO of Latin America’s largest handcrafted art paper mill, among several other affiliations. The party is likely to account for the greater share of new affiliations due to the “Marina factor”. The presence of well-known business leaders on her campaign will also help to  respond to fears that Marina Silva would adopt an anti-capitalist, green socialist agenda as a presidential candidate.

PV’s new affiliates represent a clear change of the party’s ideological outlook and a move towards a new and sharper identity. As British political scientist Anthony Giddens contends in his new book, “The Politics of Climate Change”, green is no longer the other shade of red. Several green parties, the German being the most noticeable case, have been created by former communists and socialists disillusioned with communism and dissatisfied with the conservative policies of social democratic parties. But now, they all have developed their own ideas, and a far better focused green view. They are becoming far more differentiated from socialist and social democratic parties, and proposing a new, broader, more systemic view of economy and society, having the climate change challenge, and the transition to a low carbon economy at the core of their new outlook. Green is no longer anti-capitalist, although being highly antagonistic to consumerism. The idea is to change capitalism, rather than to replace it with old socialist models.

The Chairman of FIESP, the Federation of São Paulo State Industry, once the country’s most powerful trade association, Paulo Skaff, joined the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB). He  will probably run for governor of São Paulo. The party is likely to have Rep. Ciro Gomes as a presidential candidate. The latest polls show Ciro Gomes ahead of Lula’s candidate, Dilma Roussef, but still behind São Paulo governor, the social democrat José Serra (PSDB), who has been the forerunner on all polls until now.

These party shifts and new affiliations are pointing towards a very competitive, hard fought election in 2010, at all levels. The presidential election will probably be the most competitive of the last 15 years. Elections for the House and the Senate may likely have the greater number of contested (open) seats of the last 4 elections. State elections are also posed to be highly competitive all over the country. Democracy thrives on uncertainty, so does the risk of inevitable surprises.

Sérgio Abranches

The country is approaching the first marks of the 2010 election calendar. October 3 is the last day for candidates to register with a party to become eligible for candidacy.

Sergio Abranches

Senator Marina Silva, former Environment Minister has already made up her mind and is likely to leave the Worker’s Party (PT) and run for President on a Green Party (PV) ticket in 2010, that’s what we can infer from what her closer associates are saying.