Military action imposing a no-fly zone over part of Libya, would only crystallize a divided Libya, without an aggressive political and diplomatic campaign. Such a campaign should aim at promoting the conditions for a peaceful and free regime change in Libya.

Sergio Abranches

Military action can only be a means to a clear political goal. It has to support, rather than lead or replace a political and diplomatic strategy. In the case of Libya, I can identify only one sensible political goal: to create the conditions for regime transition under the control of the Libyan people. Such a goal implies an effective political and diplomatic work, mainly conducted by legitimate Arab governmental and civil leadership. This diplomatic offensive should seek to both convince Gaddafi to stop bloodshed by stepping down, and to empower Libyan society to choose the path towards a transition that could express the free will of the majority. Libya has other leadership than Gaddafi. Some are already known and active in tribal life and in the opposition. Others have emerged from the rebellion itself, as has happened in Egypt. Social mobilization is a demiurge of  legitimate, spontaneous leadership.

If political rulers sympathetic to the Gaddafis do want to help, they should negotiate with them a true cease fire, and an exit solution. It is pretty clear that there is no good, durable, legitimate solution with the Gaddafis in power. Arab supporters of the no-fly zone should start immediately political talks with the rebels, to identify leaders and spokespersons to articulate a political alternative. Dissidents with good credentials could also have an important role in this process of simultaneous regime transition and nation building.

These rather spontaneous, mass upheavals happened in countries dominated by ruthless dictators for several decades. Organized civil society has been dismantled through repression; persecution, imprisonment, torture, and execution of opposition leaders; censorship, among other authoritarian methods. Indoctrination through massive propaganda, content-controlled education, and in some cases religious manipulation, have demobilized society and acquired “alienated support” to the regime. Disillusionment, discontent and rage against the brutal regime, and the dismal economic performance led the youth to rebel. Social media helped to spread the word, and accelerate mobilization. Contagion not only took the rebellion beyond the country’s borders, but also across generation boundaries.

In a crucial sense these are societies with strong states but without civil societies, especially organized civil societies. Amorphous societies they are to a certain extent. Civil society rises or reemerges from the rebellion itself. That’s the major demiurgical effect of revolutions and rebellions.

When some persons start to create voluntary community councils, to manage necessary services be it on occupied streets and squares, like in Egypt, be it in entire cities, like in Libya, there is a spontaneous process of organization of a reborn civil society. In this movement of emergence of a new, more active and conscious civil society, new leaders are also spontaneously identified, and legitimated. These are the forces upon which Arab and North African democracies could be built. But they need political and diplomatic support, not only military protection.

The no-fly zone divided Libya into two territories, the one centered on Tripoli, controlled by Gaddafi, and the other based on Benghazi, controlled by the rebels, and protected by UN forces under the no-fly zone. A situation reminiscent of Italian occupation, in the 1940’s, when Rome divided the country into Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. The rebels control the several cities of what once was Cyrenaica, as Benghazi, Ajdabiya, and Tobruk.

Such an outcome wouldn’t be either stable or acceptable. A new armed confrontation would be awaiting the lifting of the no-fly zone. The rebels would hardly be able to establish regular, well trained armed forces capable of opposing Gaddafi’s. A united Libya was one of the few durable outcomes of decolonization, under King Idris. The military coup that raised the young colonel Muammar Gaddafi to power maintained and strengthened unification. A divided Libya would only be acceptable and legitimate as a result of the free choice of the Libyan people, never as the outcome of military action.

The necessary political and diplomatic action required to maintain all choices open to the Libyan people to make in the process of regime transition is too timid so far, vis à vis military operations. I would say that political action is clearly lacking, while military intervention is already moving to phase two.

Sergio Abranches

Heavy-weights of the computer and electronic industries have joined forces to rid their supply-chains from “blood minerals” coming from the Congo’s militarized mines.

They are supporting “Phase 2” of the initiative developed by the tin industry organization International Tin Research Institute – ITRI,  to address the problem of minerals, mainly tin and tantalum, coming from militarized mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Militarized mining has meant massive use of forced labor, widespread violence against workers and the population in general, continued abuses of human rights, and unending war.

ITRI says that “Phase  1”, implemented in July 2009, was “a comprehensive due diligence plan for tin minerals exported from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).” It has now announced “Phase 2” of its policy, called ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative, iTSCi.

iTSCi would represent

the first practical field trial designed to address concerns over ‘conflict minerals’ from that region and has required significant commitment and funding, around US$600k, to be put in place in order to go ahead.

As I reported earlier, Phase 2 doesn’t seem to be commensurate to the dimensions and seriousness of the problem. At the same time it has the support of an impressive roster of heavy-weight downstream users of tin and tantalum in the electronics sector, such as Apple, Dell, HP, IBM, Intel, Lenovo, Microsoft, Motorola, Nokia, Nokia Siemens Networks, Philips, RIM, Sony, Telefonica, Western Digital and Xerox.

I asked Kay Nimmo, ITRI’s Manager of Sustainability and Regulatory Affairs, what has effectively been achieved with Phase 1. She answered  that Phase I

ensures all correct export permits and payments have been made, and means that all available official documentation is collected on every batch of mineral.

I also asked her why only a pilot trial in Phase 2 to address concerns over ‘conflict minerals’ in the Congo, when the problem is already well-known, demands urgent and effective responses, and ITRI has the backing of the most relevant end-users.

Nimmo said that

Phase 2, tracking to widespread and remote mines, is not a simple task and the pilot project is designed to check that the system is effective and make any necessary improvements before it is put in place more widely. The ICGLR (conference of the great lakes) aims for a full certification process in several years time; our project will contribute to that development, together with other projects which are starting now, such as one on mine standards run by the german organisation BGR. You can see from the project supporters list that all parts of the supply chain are combined in their wish to ensure the project is as successful as possible for the benefit of those in the DRC.

I have also contacted Annie Dunnebacke at Global Witness, an NGO that investigates and campaigns to prevent natural resource-related conflict and corruption. I wanted to know what she had seen in the region, on her last field trip last February, and how that related to the industry’s initiatives.

She told me that GW’s team

gathered documentary evidence (…) that some comptoirs [trading houses] implementing the ITRI scheme are currently sourcing from militarised zones. Our recent investigation also highlighted that the national army (mostly brigades commanded by former CNDP [Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple] rebels) have taken over the majority of the mining sites in eastern Congo (with the exception of gold, much of which remains under FDLR [Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda] control).

This means, according to her view, that Phase 1 was only about

ensuring that comptoirs have their paperwork in order – licences, taxes, things they should have been doing by law anyway. It is not an accomplishment, it does not address the conflict minerals problem in any way and is merely belated compliance with basic elements of Congo’s laws.

However, other situations in which illegally extracted natural resources enter the supply-chain of large global corporations showed that compliance with the law is a prerequisite to any successful attempt at banning such products from regular markets.

Annie Dunnebacke’s stronger point is that if

the ITRI scheme does not cover the army – so it does not address the heart of the problem.

She also argues that

companies that source minerals from eastern DRC have a responsibility to make sure their supply chains are free of all materials from militarised mines right now, not at some point in the future. The violence associated with militarised mineral trade is not a future prospect, it is immediate and is costing lives. Any scheme that does not include regular field investigations and independent audits by companies is meaningless.

Kay Nimmo won’t debate with GW through the media, but says if the NGO wishes to make direct contact to “positively engage” and “make useful suggestions of their own”, they are welcome. She also says that engagement would allow GW to become more fully informed of ITRI’s endeavors to tackle the problem.

Annie Dunnebacke told me they have already made concrete corporate policy recommendations to individual companies like Apple or Nokia, such as

Publish credible evidence that the tin, tantalum and tungsten in their products is conflict-free:

Publish the identity of their suppliers of tin, tantalum and tungsten.

Contractually require suppliers to disclose the mine of origin for all tin, tantalum and tungsten from DRC or neighbouring countries.

Contractually require suppliers that source from DRC or neighbouring countries to publish written evidence of the comprehensive due diligence they have carried out on their supply chain to ensure that the minerals have not passed through the hands of armed groups or military units, benefited them in other ways or otherwise involved human rights abuses.

Conduct spot checks of their suppliers and commission and publish regular independent audits of their supply chain

“Blood minerals” and militarized conflict in African regions, like the Congo, are what conflict analysts call “an intractable problem”. Stopping the flow of income that enables conflicting groups to arm themselves is a prerequisite to start making it more tractable. Only large end-users of these “blood minerals” can stop that flow and help to create alternative sources of income to the local population. This is a clear case of strong correlation between sustainable development and corporate sustainability.

One cannot rely on governments of “failed states” to effectively address the suffering of their people. Only corporate action in concert with social movements seem to have the means to create small paths that with time, coherent commitment, and corporate social responsibility may really lead to state rebuilding and conflict resolution.

High-tech is linked to war and brutality not only through the arms industry. Computers, cellphones, and other electronic equipment can be part of a shocking connection of highly advanced technology with human suffering, forced labor and unending war. Does it sound too preposterous?

Sergio Abranches

Well just take a look at the 2009 report “Faced with a gun, what can you do? War and the militarisation of mining in eastern Congo” by Global Witness. It tells us about the “conflict minerals” or “blood minerals” that are widely used by high-tech electronic industries. Raw-material in their supply-chain could have been sourced from many parts of the provinces of North and South Kivu, where armed groups and the Congolese national army control the trade in cassiterite (tin ore), gold, columbite-tantalite (coltan), wolframite (a source of tungsten) and other minerals. The report documents a billionaire tale of brutality, tyranny, and corruption. Not too dissimilar from the story most of us came to know from the movie “Blood Diamond”, directed by Edward Zwick, with Leonardo Di Caprio, Djimon Hounsou, and Jennifer Connely or from National Geographic’s documentary Blood Diamond (Diamond of War).

In their broader struggle to seize economic, political and military power, all the main warring parties have carried out the most horrific human rights abuses, including widespread killings of unarmed civilians, rape, torture and looting, recruitment of child soldiers to fight in their ranks, and forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. The lure of eastern Congo’s mineral riches is one of the factors spurring them on. By the time these minerals reach their ultimate destinations – the international markets in Europe, Asia, North America and elsewhere – their origin, and the suffering caused by this trade, has long been forgotten.

These minerals of war end up into advanced products of major global companies, reports Global Witness:

Several of the main comptoirs – trading houses based in Goma and Bukavu – buy, sell and export minerals produced by or benefiting the warring parties. They include Groupe Olive, Muyeye, MDM, Panju and others. The fact that these comptoirs are officially licensed and registered with the Congolese government acts as a cover for laundering minerals which are fuelling the conflict. These comptoirs’ customers include European and Asian companies, such as the Thailand Smelting and Refining Corporation (THA ISARCO), the world’s fifth-largest tin-producing company, owned by British metals giant Amalgamated Metal Corporation (AMC); British company Afrimex; and several Belgian companies such as Trademet and Traxys. These companies sell the minerals on to a range of processing and manufacturing companies, including firms in the electronics industry. Economic actors are turning a blind eye to the impact of their trade. They continue to plead ignorance as to the origin of their supplies and hide behind a multitude of other excuses for failing to implement practices which would exclude from their supply chain minerals which are fueling the armed conflict.

The report says that cassiterite (tin ore) is the most important blood mineral in terms of quantity and price. It has many uses as a component in the production of solders, tin plating and alloys. Downstream users are the electronics and tin can industries. Electronic solders alone accounted for over 44% of all refined tin in 2007. In 2007 and 2008 the so-called Democratic Republic of Congo accounted for about 5% of global tin ore production.

The trading houses – comptoirs – are, according to Global Witness, a critical part of this chain of supply and export of minerals, in a setting of violence, exploitation, environmental and human degradation.

“We all end up buying minerals which, in some way, have been produced illegally. You can’t just ask us to stop. We have no alternatives other than closing,” a representative of one to the comptoirs told Global Witness.

Global Witness has written to about 200 companies all over the world inquiring about their trade practices in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Some of the companies which replied to Global Witness stated that they were committed to upholding and improving due diligence policies. However, the policies or internal codes of conduct they refer to are fairly general and do not include specific safeguards against the mineral trade fueling armed conflict.

Global Witness’s view at the time of the report is that the industry lacked a coherent plan to address the conflict dimension of the mineral trade.

The industry has adopted some actions to address the problem, coordinated by its trade association, the International Tin Research Institute – ITRI. The Institute claims that “Phase  1”, implemented in July 2009, was “a comprehensive due diligence plan for tin minerals exported from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).” It is now announcing “Phase 2” of its policy called ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative, iTSCi.

ITRI says that iTSCi represents “the first practical field trial designed to address concerns over ‘conflict minerals’ from that region and has required significant commitment and funding, around US$600k, to be put in place in order to go ahead.”

Phase 2 consists of “a pilot trial which will begin to track minerals and provide verifiable provenance information from individual mine sites in eastern DRC; something that has not been possible up to now.”

This initiative has the support of an impressive number of well-know downstream users of tin and tantalum in the electronics sector, such as Apple, Dell, HP, IBM, Intel, Lenovo, Microsoft, Motorola, Nokia, Nokia Siemens Networks, Philips, RIM, Sony, Telefonica, Western Digital and Xerox.

Kay Nimmo, ITRI’s Manager of Sustainability and Regulatory Affairs says that the industry can now “move ahead with this next step in the iTSCi project” which “really demonstrates the commitment of the tin, and now also the tantalum sector, to find a solution to this difficult issue.”

It is a welcome move, but it still seems to be too weak a response to such a brutal problem. Global Witness acknowledges that many mining and electronic companies have clear policies regarding the sustainability of their supply-chain, but due diligence procedures fall short of adequately addressing the problem of the warring parties’ control of a major share of mineral supplies.

A Group of Experts nominated by the UN in 2004 to recommend actions regarding conflict minerals, issued a report in 2008, urging UN member states to “take appropriate measures to ensure that exporters and consumers of Congolese mineral products under their jurisdiction conduct due diligence on their suppliers and not accept verbal assurances from buyers regarding the origin of their product”.

ITRI’s plan to track minerals and provide verifiable provenance information could be an important instrument for origin certification in the supply-chain. Similar cases of illegal goods entering the production process of large, competitive companies show that only the giant corporate downstream users have the power to enforce rules aiming at cleaning the supply-chain.

The situation doesn’t seem to have improved much since Global Witness issued its report and ITRI implemented Phase 1 of its project. Annie Dunnebacke, just back from a month in eastern DRC, reports that:

For more than a decade now, the country’s mineral wealth has provided an incentive and a cash base for the conflict to continue. Unless the government and international donors implement a comprehensive strategy which tackles once and for all the economic drivers of this conflict, the local population will continue to suffer and the country’s future will continue to be blighted.

Emilie Serralta, also part of Global Witness’ team just back from the Congo, adds that the

capacity of the former rebels to siphon off revenue from the mines means they could afford to re-arm if they decide peace no longer suits them. This is particularly dangerous considering the ex-commanders’ history of reverting to rebellion when they don’t get what they want.

Global Witness said on a recent press release to have evidence that companies in eastern DRC and Rwanda are still buying goods directly from militarized mines.

Some in the industry have committed on paper to greater supply chain traceability and more responsible sourcing practices, but so far companies buying minerals from eastern Congo have failed to move beyond the rhetoric and put in place credible due diligence measures.

Annie Dunnebacke contends, on a Global Witness press release, that

It’s not enough for companies to rely on promises made or paperwork filled out by their suppliers. If companies want to avoid being complicit in the conflict and human rights abuses, they have to carry out investigations to find out exactly which mines the goods come from, and who has benefited from the trade. Information about who controls which mine site is common knowledge in the trading towns of eastern Congo. Companies buying minerals from militarised areas cannot claim ignorance.

Sergio Abranches
President Obama is on a hazardous trail in Afghanistan. Since the campaign he showed conviction that the US public supported the Bush doctrine of homeland security. He also made all efforts, and continues to go too cautiously not to alienate his conservative following, at least as far as military policy is concerned.

As a result, he adopted a policy towards Iraq and Afghanistan that has more continuity than change. This policy is everyday a bit farther from the expectations of the domestic, and the global majority that saw Obama’s election as a promise of change.

Like in Iraq, and before that, in Vietnam, US policy in Afghanistan has lost hold of the values that inspired most US citizens to support foreign military incursions. It has always been a real problem to separate ideology from real threats in the justification of military to promote freedom, democracy, and to defend the US against clear and present dangers to her security. War escalation has more often than not led to a growing estrangement between values and actual action. War engagement became increasingly dirty and aimless, values were lost on campaign, goals became blurred and were never met, at the end. This is a brief synthesis of the painful and long history of US engagement in Vietnam. In Iraq, ideology has been a stronger inspiration, than real values, from the beginning. Although soldiers showed bravery and endurance no matter how justifiable the intervention was, as a military operation, it has always been devoid of true meaning and sound values.

In Afghanistan, the first incursion, after 9/11 met widespread support. The breakdown of the Taliban grip on Afghans was celebrated by everybody supporting freedom to all, women liberation, and equal rights. The continuation of US presence, though, lacked a truly justifiable target, and its value-base was, to say the least, frail. The failure to create an autonomous way for the Afghans to move away from the Taliban and build a more open society, has turned the policy into a trap. The circumstances of the electoral campaign led Obama, understandably, to adopt a cautious standing. But the electoral campaign is long gone. The government so far has been unable to propose a new policy. Soldiers continue to die from Taliban attacks. The Afghan government is conceding more and more to Taliban values and impositions. The real risk is for the US to contribute to the consolidation of a fake democracy, that will serve as a cover to the hegemony of Taliban ideas, even though under a supposedly anti-Taliban government.

The numerous cases of electoral fraud favoring Hamid Karzai stand as clear evidence of how easily Obama can loose track in Afghanistan. These elections are hopelessly tainted by Taliban voter intimidation and blackmail. Electoral fraud by Mullahs decided not to admit the possibility of victory from a more liberal opposition on a run-off is widespread and indisputable, on the light of the evidence already collected.

Is Obama willing to put the lives of his soldiers on harm’s way to support a fraudulent, Taliban-influenced government, supported by Mullah tyrants, and corrupt local chieftains willing to threat, oppress, and deceive to prevent truly competitive elections? There is no democracy, where the opposition does not have a fair and equal chance of winning power through free and honest elections. Karzai’s rule will be unavoidably marked by electoral corruption, violent oppression, corruption, and concessions to the Taliban regarding women’s right. Will US soldiers fight and die for it?